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Management Summary 
Financial analysts and their work have attracted the interest of numerous researchers. As the 
banking sector employs thousands of (mostly sell-side) analysts to cover corporations and 
to write ,,independent” research reports in order to issue ‘Buy’, ‘Hold’ or ‘Sell’ 
recommendations, one can expect to generate excess returns by trading according to analysts 
recommendation revisions. This means their activities are expected to have value and also 
banks argue that their equity analysts, who are known as experts within their industries they 
follow, increase market efficiency. So far, the results of previously conducted research on 
the United States equity market examined the impact of analysts’ recommendations on stock 
prices and their publications showed remarkably that analysts add value to the market. Those 
findings contradict the efficient market hypothesis which states that if the semi-strong and 
strong form of the hypothesis holds, no excess returns can be achieved by action on 
fundamental analysis such as analyst reports.  
 
The main purpose of this master thesis “Do Analysts’ Recommendations have Investment 
Value”, was to investigate if analysts’ recommendations issued on corporations included in 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average during the time period ranging from 2000 to 2017, have 
investment value. Specifically, it was examined whether it was worthwhile to act upon 
analysts’ recommendations, issued on the 30 largest and mainly publicly owned companies 
in the United States. In this context to answer the quoted research question, it was required 
to answer hypotheses which cover the behavior of analysts’ recommendations, analysts’ 
preferences regarding coverage of a particular sector, the impact of recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades on the respective security prices, the relationship between 
analysts’ recommendations and market sentiments, the impact of analyst coverage and 
brokerage coverage on security prices. 
 
The methodology used in this study in order to analyze analysts’ recommendations issued 
from brokerage firms on the respective securities included in the DJIA is primarily 
quantitative. The quantitative analysis was conducted through descriptive statistics, the 
abnormal returns were calculated via regression analysis, security price reactions were 
analyzed around the reported recommendation event date by applying the event study 
methodology and lastly the price performance of recommendation revisions were analyzed 
by applying a cross-sectional regression analysis. 
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The results on analysts’ recommendations frequency distribution showed evidently that 
analysts are firstly issuing more optimistic recommendations, secondly issuing less 
frequently sell recommendations and thirdly have a clear preference to cover a certain sector, 
namely the attractive technology sector. The event study aimed at analyzing security price 
reactions in form of abnormal returns in the pre-event window before the event 
‘recommendation announcement’ happened and after the event in the post-event window. 
The results of abnormal returns for upgrades showed that investors are not able to gain excess 
returns by trading according to analysts revised recommendation direction and investors are 
therefore not able to obtain a value from analysts work. Contrarily, recommendation 
downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns and are moving towards analysts’ 
forecasted directions. The empirical results of the cross-sectional regression analysis have 
evidently rejected analysts’ ability to be able to discover stocks which are undervalued or 
overvalued. Overall, for recommendation upgrades and downgrades this thesis found 
significant volume reactions around and before the event date, which imply analysts’ 
recommendations have a significant effect on the volume traded of the respective securities, 
centered around the recommendation event date. 
 
In conclusion, the empirical findings of this research showed that analysts are predominantly 
issuing optimistic recommendations and have a tendency to revise their previous 
recommendations. Investors have not a value in form of positive abnormal returns and 
following that one could reasonably ask what real value analysts have. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an introduction to the topic and provides an overview of this master 
thesis. As a starting point the background and the situation in analyzing the investment 
value of analysts are presented. This section also describes the research question and the 
subsequent hypotheses.  
 
1.1 Background and Situation 
Extant literature has explored analysts stock recommendations extensively and the 
interest in analyzing analysts for financial researchers is of significant interest as their 
activities affect capital market efficiency.  
 
Analysts are seen as an important agent between investors and companies they follow and 
their main tasks are forecasting earnings, writing stock recommendations reports and 
assisting with their opinions indirectly investment banking trading volumes. Based on 
their intensive analytical research process, analysts provide buy, hold or sell 
recommendations to clients, potential investors or to their own asset management 
departments. Their activities leave space for fundamental questions, for example are 
analysts able to predict winner stocks and loser stocks? If so, how quickly are 
information's provided by analysts incorporated in market prices, do analysts have the 
ability to predict market movements and are analysts assisting markets to move towards 
efficiency?  
 
According to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) observations the market does not perfectly 
incorporate all information's and investors need analysts as market agent, who are able to 
find overvalued and undervalued securities and keep the markets efficient. Whereas 
advocates for efficient market hypothesis claim that markets and stock prices reflect all 
publicly information analysts’ recommendations do not result in any value to investors as 
stock price movements are unpredictable and they follow a random walk. This view is 
kind of naive, as the banking sector employs thousands of analysts whose job is to follow 
corporations in order to collect data, analyze data, and publish reports about earnings, 
 2 
growth potential, management quality, and to give, based on the analyzing process; buy, 
hold or sell recommendations; otherwise the huge effort would not be compensated.  
 
Further previous literature, like Sahut (2011) and Mola (2012) confirmed analysts are 
reducing information asymmetries and their actively monitoring activities tend to reduce 
the principal-agent problem between managers and outside investors. Sahut (2011) 
confirms the more analysts are following a corporation, the lower is the information 
asymmetry and the less volatile are stock returns. 
 
Furthermore, it is common known that sell-side analysts are more reluctant to issue 
negative recommendations, which is confirmed by several statistical analyses like Stickel 
(1995), Womack (1996) and Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001). Reasons 
for the rareness of negative recommendations is the risk to hurt the investment banking 
relationship with the subsequent downgraded company and the risk for incorrect sell 
recommendation is much higher than for an incorrect buy recommendation. Due to the 
less frequency of negative recommendations, the attention and therefore the after-effect 
is much higher.  
 
One part of my research is to address the question if analysts’ recommendations have 
investment value? If the information can be used systematically then it would be possible 
for investors to get an added value in form of higher performance returns (generate alpha) 
and analysts must have the ability to find underpriced and overpriced stocks. 
 
My analysis has shown there is a gap in the research in analyzing the performance of 
recommendations and their investment value, as the most research papers are based on 
the time period prior to 2000.  
3 
 
1.2 Objective and Research Aim 
The aim of this broad area is manifold and throughout the scope of this research study, 
therefore the author seeks to identify empirically, the market impact of analysts' 
recommendation upgrades and downgrades on the 30 stocks listed in the U.S. Dow Jones 
Industrial Average Index (DJIA).  
 
The main motivation of this study is to answer the question whether, it is it worth to 
follow the analysts in the US stock market and if these recommendations are valuable to 
investors.  
 
In this context, the sample data should provide answers to the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Analysts are issuing mostly optimistic recommendations and are more  
reluctant to issue sell recommendations. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Analysts are following large capitalized corporations and are largely  
covering certain attractive sectors. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Change in recommendations for stocks with low analyst coverage  
have a greater positive impact on prices compared to stocks with high 
analyst coverage. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Analysts are able to add value through finding overpriced and  
underpriced securities. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Analysts do more upgrades in recommendations when investor  
sentiment is high and more downgrades when investor sentiment is low. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Change in recommendations for stocks with high brokerage coverage have  
a greater impact on prices than stocks with lower brokerage coverage. 
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1.3 Research Question 
This master thesis is based on assessing if sell-side analysts employed by investment 
banks and brokerage houses have investment value for investors. 
 
Thus, the addressed research question is: 
 
Do Analysts’ Recommendations have Investment Value? 
 
In order to be able to answer the research question of this master thesis, it is imperative 
to design a clear and structured methodology which is being explained in section three 
Research Methodology. 
 
1.4 Overview 
The remainder of this empirical master thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter two provides a review of relevant literature on the research areas - analyzing the 
investment value and the profitability of sell-side security analysts. The selected review 
contains the most useful approaches in assessing the investment value and profitability of 
analysts' recommendations.  
 
Chapter three presents the primary data, the rating scale classification and the applied 
research methodology and its specification in order to conduct the descriptive analysis, to 
analyze the impact of recommendation revisions on stock prices and the cross-sectional 
regression analysis.  
 
The fourth chapter aims to response the questioned hypothesis, shows and evaluates the 
results of the research and chapter five summarizes the findings and discusses some of 
their implications.
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents in chronological order a review of relevant literature, as well as the 
most important findings regarding how analysts stock recommendations affect stock 
returns and to which extend investors are able to achieve abnormal returns. Previous 
research, for example Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber et al. (1998), Barber et al. 
(2001) and Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee (2004) have demonstrated in their studies 
that consensus analysts' recommendations can beat the market and carry investment 
value.  
 
The content of each summary is based on each academic publication and the quotations 
are declared underneath each summary.  
 
2.1 Recommendation Research before and during 1980s  
The first academic research paper with the title "Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?" 
in assessing if security analysts can beat the market with their recommendations was 
conducted by Alfred Cowles in 1933.   
The paper is divided into two parts, the first part analyses the forecasting ability regarding 
superior returns of 20 fire insurance companies and 16 financial services during the 
sample period ranging from 1928 to July 1932, while the second part deals with the ability 
to predict future stock price levels, forecasted by 24 financial publications. Cowles 
finding was that some 7500 recommendations on stocks did not outperform the market 
and neither achieved abnormal returns and no specific investment skills were present. The 
same poor performance was confirmed for the forecasting ability of the future stock 
market movements from publications like the Wall Street Journal. A significant impact 
for the underperformance can be related due to the exogenous effect of the great crash in 
1929 and their after-effect. According to Michaely and Womack (2002a) the 
underperformance could be a result of Cowles incorrect computation and a misstated 
understanding of benchmark investing during this time. 
(Cowles, Alfred, 1933) 
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No further research was in the field of analysts' recommendations forecasting ability 
existent until the 1970s.  
 
In 1986 Elton, Gruber and Grossman examined with a first comprehensive database the 
period from 1981 to 1983 consisting of 720 analysts from 33 brokerage firms. The paper 
titled, "Discrete Expectational Data and Portfolio Performance" focus was mainly on 
large capitalized corporations, which had a minimum coverage of three analysts. The 
study analyzed the monthly impact of recommendation changes, upgrades (from a lower 
to a higher rating) and downgrades (from a higher to a lower rating). Descriptive summary 
statistic for the sample shows a recommendation distribution of 48.00% buy and just 
2.00% of sell recommendations. Beta-adjusted returns delivered for both scenarios 
insignificant excess returns. Upgrades, accumulated in the month after the 
recommendation release abnormal returns of 3.43%, while downgrades resulted in 
negative excess returns of -2.26%.  
  
Drawback of the study is, that the calculation of beta-adjusted returns is based on a 
monthly basis one month after the recommendation announcement and therefore the real 
impact of the recommendation change on returns is unclear. 
(Elton, et. al., 1986)  
 
2.2 Publications 1994 - 1999 
Following publications differ to Elton et. al., (1986) approach, as these studies are based 
on a larger scale database and the calculation of abnormal returns is based on a daily basis, 
to capture the immediately impact of recommendation announcements on stock prices 
and their returns. 
 
"The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell Recommendations" analyzed the 
short-term and long-term price performance of 8,790 buy and 8,167 sell 
recommendations from the financial data source Zack, which obtained written 
recommendation reports from brokerage research departments. This research was based 
on a unique database covering the period 1988-1991, on 1,179 covered stocks, made by 
1,510 security analysts from 80 security firms.  
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Stickel's (1995) study contributes to the existing literature, as the focus is on the 
determinants of stock performance on those stock recommendations and by the use of a 
cross-sectional analysis. With a cross-sectional regression analysis, six hypotheses were 
tested in order to identify which factors contribute most to the stock price performance of 
those buy and sell recommendations.  
 
Following factors were in the multiple regression analysis included: 
- The recommendation strength 
- The size of the recommendation change, by how much it skips ranks 
- Analyst reputation 
- Number of employed analysts per brokerage firm and 
- The difference in the market capitalization of those covered equities. 
 
The uncertainty if a recommendation was announced before or after entering Zacks 
database was taken into account through ±5-day time window. In total, Stickel (1995) 
observed 21,387 recommendation changes, with a frequency distribution of 55% buy, 
33% hold and 12% sell recommendations.  
Buy recommendations contributed with a mean of 1.16% to a price increase, while sell 
recommendations led to an average decline of -1.28% in the time window ±5 day, centred 
on the recorded recommendation date by Zacks. 
(Stickel, Scott E., 1995) 
Womack's (1996) research with the title "Do Brokerage Analysts Recommendations 
Have Investment Value?" contributes to the academic literature as the paper examines 
how stock prices and volumes react to changes in analysts' recommendations.  
In order to examine his analysis Womack collected the data from First Call, a database, 
which collected real-time recommendations directly from the majority of US and 
international security firms and provided access to this data to investors through an on-
line PC system. Years ranging from 1989-1991 were studied in the research with a focus 
on a narrow sample by examining the recommendations of the fourteen major U.S. 
brokerage firms. With the focus in analyzing the stock recommendations of 14 brokerage 
research departments, the author aimed to control the immediately availability of their 
research reports to institutional investors and investment managers. 
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Womack's study is based on a database of 1,573 changes in analyst recommendations 
from strong buy to strong sell, or from strong sell to strong buy, made on 822 different 
companies. Womack examined analyst’s recommendation changes by dividing the 
sample of 1,573 recommendation changes into four categories: added or removed stocks 
from the most favorable category buy or added or removed stocks from the least favorable 
category sell.  
The remarkable result to emerge out of the authors sample data is that the majority of the 
analysts’ recommendations were issued on large-capitalization companies, while just 
10% of the recommendations are recommended on small-capitalization companies. 
Further was examined the category added to buy contains significantly most of the 
recommendations, than added to sell category. Which also is a significant evidence that 
analysts are more reluctant to issue sell recommendations. Womack's results show 
significant price reactions for stocks added to buy and for stocks added to sell. The price 
for stocks added to the buy list increased on average in the 3-day time window by 3.00%, 
while the stocks added to the sell category declined on average by -4.70%. The results 
are adjusted for size, industry and by using the Fama-French three factor model. Further, 
he provides evidence that stock prices after recommendation changes move significantly 
towards analysts forecasted recommendation direction. After the recommendation 
release, upgraded stocks added to buy drift on average by 2.4% which holds up to three 
months, while downgraded stocks added to sell drift over a six-month period on average 
by -9.1%. Similarly, to Barber et. al. (1998), recommendation changes on small-
capitalized companies caused a larger market movement, compared to recommendation 
changes on large-capitalized companies. Decomposition of the post-recommendation 
drift shows excess returns are not mean reverting and the market movement towards 
analyst’s recommendation direction does not appear to be short lifted.   
Womack's findings give compelling evidence that analysts recommendation changes 
significantly influenced stock prices. 
(Womack, Kent L., 1996) 
The published academic paper by Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, "Can 
investors profit from the prophets? Consensus analyst recommendations and stock 
returns" build the fundamental basis in the question of the profitability of 
recommendations issued by security analysts.  
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This analysis is based on a unique database provided by the Research Investment database 
Zack, which encompasses over 360,000 recommendations, issued from 269 brokerage 
houses, provided from 4,340 analysts over the time period 1986 to 1996. The 
recommendation frequency of the database excluding recommendations with termination 
of coverage showed a distribution of 54.0% of buy recommendations, 39.5% of hold and 
the minority of 6.3% of sell recommendations respectively.  
 
By building calendar time portfolios and classifying the covered firms according to their 
average ratings into five portfolios, where the first portfolio consists of the most highly 
recommended stocks, for which the rating Ai,t-1 is in the scale 1 ≤ Ai, t-1 ≤ 1.5 and the fifth 
portfolio with a rating scale Ai, t-1 ≥  3 contains the least recommended stocks. This 
approach follows the rating scale, rating (1) a strong buy, (2) a buy, (3) a hold, (4) a sell 
and (5) a strong sell recommendation. The returns are then calculated for each portfolio 
after the close of the trading day. The daily value-weighted returns Rp,t for each portfolio 
p on each day t, are then further compounded to a monthly return. The next step involves 
the calculation of market adjusted-returns by taking the difference of the monthly 
portfolio return and the monthly return on a value-weighted market index. As the portfolio 
classification technique rebalances the portfolio after the close of the trading day, the 
return calculation uses the similar approach and calculates monthly-adjusted returns by 
excluding first-day return to analysts’ recommendations. This approach takes into 
account that investors cannot act before any research reports are made public. 
 
The results showed over the sample period a significant outperformance of the most 
highly recommended portfolio by an annualized geometric mean of 18.8% while the least 
recommended portfolio returned on average just 5.78%. The outperformance of the most 
favorably recommended stocks is even persistent after controlling for Fama-French 
factors and momentum factors, were a positive excess return of 4% per year was achieved, 
while a negative annually excess return of 5% was earned by the least favorably 
recommended stocks. In the end, the results are most pronounced for small and medium 
sized companies. This strong evidence justified the ability of research departments to 
transfer the costs of intensive security analysis into superior returns for their investors. 
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Limitation of the paper is that the calculation of the outperformance in based before 
deducting transaction costs. 
(Barber et al., 1998) 
"How Do Stock Markets Process Analysts' Recommendations?" by Juergens (1999) 
provides evidence to the question whether analysts’ recommendations have investment 
value. The primary data used was gathered from the same data source as Womack's (1996) 
research is based on. 3,679 recommendations for over 208 firms in the sector computer 
or computer-related firms were analyzed in the sample period 1993 to 1996. 
The author contributes to the literature as the analysis is based on all types of 
recommendations, while Stickel (1995) Womack (1996) analyzed only changes from the 
most highly recommended stocks and changes from the least recommended stocks. 
Further it differs by analyzing the impact of analysts' recommendations and public 
announcements on daily and on intraday returns. 
 
Summary statistic shows for the period ranging from 1993-1996 a dramatically increase 
in the number of firms covered by analysts and an increase in the total number of 
recommendations. In line with findings from Stickel (1995) and Womack (1999) her 
sample contains the similar recommendation frequency distribution, as the sample exits 
of 56% positive recommendations and 3% of sell recommendations. These findings 
provide again evidence that analysts are more reluctant to issue sell recommendations. 
The same can be concluded from a 5 x 5 recommendation change matrix, as most of the 
recommendations are centered in the upper part. Looking on abnormal returns confirm 
the ability to outperform the market by following analysts’ recommendations. 
Remarkable cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were achieved by recommendation 
changes from hold to strong buy upgrade which resulted into a 3-day CAR of 4.14%, 
which is of greater magnitude then found in previous studies.1 In contrast a downgrade 
change from strong buy to hold earned on average a negative CAR rate of -5.39%. All 
positive recommendations have earned on average a 3-day CAR of 1.91%, while all 
negative recommendations garnered a negative return of -3.14%. Significantly return 
                                                 
1 Stickel (1995) achieved abnormal returns of 1.16% in a 11-day time window, while Womack (1996) 
achieved in a 3-day time window returns of 3.0%. 
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difference was further confirmed with a mean difference test. The market impact of 
analysts' recommendations was further assessed by intraday return calculation. Intraday 
returns were calculated for 15-minute intervals in the time frame, two hours before and 
two hours after the recommendation announcement. The results were significant at the 
1% significance level for positive recommendations (0.55%) and negative 
recommendations earned -1.27%.  
 
To conclude Juergens analysis confirmed, it is possible to earn significant intraday returns 
with analysts' recommendations and those reports provide investment value around the 
recommendation announcement time.  
(Juergens, 1999) 
 
2.3 Publications 2000 - 2010 
Barber et. al. research paper "Prophets and losses: Reassessing the returns to analysts' 
stock recommendations" continues on his previous research (1998) where analyst’s 
recommendation has significantly outperformed those recommendations of the least 
recommended stocks throughout the time period 1986-1996.  
 
His subsequent paper aims to validate if the outperformance is still present during the 
narrow time frame from 1996 to 2000, where it was widely spread analysts were working 
in favor of investment banking activities and writing research reports in favor for 
companies which are having a client relationship with the investment bank. A total of 
160,000 recommendations were collected from Thomson Financial' s database First Call, 
made by 299 securities firms, covering 9,621 companies. Breaking down the total number 
of recommendations, the sample contains overall of 67.9% of strong buy/ buy, 29.1% of 
hold and 3.0% of sell/ strong sell recommendations.  
 
The analysis follows the approach of Barber et al (1998), where the covered firms are 
based on their average ratings, placed into five portfolios on a calendar time basis.  
Analysts buy recommendations have on average significantly outperformed those of least 
favorable recommendations during 1996-99, while on the contrary this outperformance 
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vanished in the year 2000 regardless of the market phase and of the sectors of those 
recommended stocks. The most highly recommended stocks returned on average 
annualized excess return of -31.20%, while the market-adjusted return for the least 
recommended stocks averaged an annualized return of 48.66%. This unpredicted pattern 
and the huge dispersion between both portfolio performance raises questions over the 
usefulness of the investment value of analyst’s stock recommendations in the long-term. 
There is still considerable uncertainty if the year 2000 is a turning point in the usefulness 
of analysts’ accuracy and if this is caused by increasing incentives to forecasting towards 
investment banking benefits. 
(Barber et. al., 2001) 
In 2004 Barber et. al. expanded his analysis of security analyst’s investment value by, 
investigating in his publication “Comparing the stock recommendation performance of 
investment banks and independent research firms”, the profitability of security 
recommendations issued from independent research firms and investment banks, for a 
narrow sample window during the period 1996 to 2003.  
 
The conducted study collected the data from Thomson Financial' s First Call database and 
the data sample encompassed 335,000 recommendations issued by 409 securities firms. 
 
This paper divides analysts’ recommendations into two samples, issued by independent 
research firms (without any investment banking activities) and issued by investment 
banks. It further divides the sub samples, according to their ratings into two sub portfolios, 
first portfolio with buy recommendations and second portfolio with hold and sell 
recommendations.  
 
By using the Fama-French Method and controlling for market risk, size, book-to-market 
and price momentum effects, the daily abnormal returns were calculated for each portfolio 
respectively. 
 
A further analysis was conducted by splitting the time period into two market phases, 
time frame until March 10, 2000 refers as the bull market and following to that date as 
the bear market. 
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The sample of investment banks buy recommendation is further broken down into three 
investment banking categories in order to investigate if a performance difference exists 
between sanctioned and non-sanctioned investment banks. 
 
The results confirm the hypothesis that investment banks are more reluctant to downgrade 
stocks, as the findings showed investment banks are not able to outperform buy 
recommendations of independent research firms. The buy portfolio of independent 
research firms has outperformed by 3.1 basis points (bps) on a daily basis or by 8% yearly. 
On the other hand, the hold and sell portfolio of investment banks has outperformed by -
1.8 bps per day and annualized by -4.5%, those recommendations of independent research 
firms. These results conclude by following the sell recommendations of investment 
banking research, investors are able to minimize their financial losses.  
Investment banking buy recommendations have on average outreached those of 
independent research firms, by a statistically insignificant 0.4 bps in the bull market. 
While in the bear market independent research firms buy recommendations have 
exceeded significantly those of investment banks by 6.9 bps on a daily basis and more 
than 17% annually. The market phase analysis further confirms, investment banking hold 
and sell recommendations are able to outperform independent research firms, as the 
results showed the majority of their hold and sell recommendations are concentrated in 
the bear market and outperformed those of independent research firms by 3.5 bps per day. 
 
The performance analysis between the three investment banking categories, with the 
group sanctioned investment banks2 (containing of 10 banks), non-sanctioned investment 
banks (which are lead underwriter like the 10 sanctioned banks) and non-sanctioned 
banks (with no active lead underwriter role, which are syndicate members) showed, there 
is no difference among the performance of sanctioned and non-sanctioned investment 
banks compared to independent research firms. All three categories were not able to 
outperform those buy recommendations of independent research firms and do not show 
evidence that non-sanctioned banks provide independent research reports to investors. 
Conflict of interest claims of sell side analysts are supported by Barber et. al. results.  
                                                 
2 10 Investment banks were sanctioned in 2003 in the SECs Global Research Analyst Settlement. 
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(Barber et. al., 2005) 
Years ranging from 1985-1998 were studied in the research published by Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische and Lee in “Analyzing the Analysts: When do Recommendations Add Value?” 
with a focus finding out the source of investment value those recommendations provide. 
As a primary data source Zacks Investment Research database was used.  
 
Recommendation level and changes in recommendations were analyzed by using twelve 
characteristic variables, which have the ability to predict returns as confirmed by previous 
literature and previous studies. 
These twelve explanatory variables are categorized into five categories:  
(1) Momentum and Trading Volume;  
(2) Valuation Multiples; 
(3) Growth Indicators;  
(4) Firm Size and  
(5) Fundamental Indicators. 
As these twelve variables are correlated with future returns, Jegadeesh et. al. expected, a 
correlation towards the same way with recommendation level and changes. 
The hypothesis of this study is, if analysts are paying attention to these variables in the 
above-mentioned categories, then most recommended stocks must be based on following 
characteristic:  
• High momentum stocks and / or low volume stocks;  
• High valuation with a high earnings-to-price ratio (EP) and high book-to-price 
ratio (PB);  
• Low past growth and low expected future growth or  
• Low accruals ratio and low capital expenditure ratio. 
Recommendation level is calculated as an average of all outstanding recommendations 
within one calendar year, while the recommendation change is calculated as the difference 
between the current calendar quarter and the prior calendar quarter, which results either 
in an increase or decrease in the consensus level of analyst recommendation.  
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This study used descriptive statistic, by analyzing on a firm level the sample distribution 
across years. The results show a remarkable increase in firm observations over time and 
yields over 56 quarters an average of 971.4 firm observations per quarter. A further 
descriptive analysis was conducted on the analyst’s sample recommendations. Consensus 
recommendation levels and recommendation changes were grouped into quintiles, where 
the quintile 0.00 contains the least recommended stocks and the quintile 1.00 contains the 
most recommended stocks. The outcome of the five consensus recommendation level 
quintiles, are in line with other studies and confirm clearly, analysts are more reluctant to 
issue sell recommendations. On the other hand, the results of the recommendation 
changes quintiles, show firms were more likely to be downgraded than upgraded by 
analysts.  
 
Positive correlation between future market-adjusted returns and recommendation level 
and changes was examined by using the Spearman rank correlation method and the results 
give evidence for analyst’s predictive ability in stock recommendations. The Spearman 
rank correlation was further used for assessing the correlation between future returns and 
the twelve investment variables. The findings confirmed a correlation between the 
explanatory variables and future returns. The variables positive price momentum, positive 
earnings momentum, and total accrual ratio were in 75% of the quarters presents and were 
identified as the most predictive variables with the ability of causing positive future 
returns. The Spearman correlation analysis between consensus recommendation level and 
changes in recommendation with the twelve defined investment variables, demonstrated 
a strong positive correlation with momentum factors. This implies analysts most 
favorably recommendations are based on securities with momentum factors. Further 
analysts prefer high turnover stocks, low PB, high EP, high past growth and high expected 
future growth as well stocks with a high accruals and high capital expenditure ratios. 
Analysts preference for momentum stocks, was further confirmed by using a multivariate 
regression analysis, with analyst’s recommendation as the dependent variable and the 
twelve investment variables as explanatory variables.  
 
Summarizing up Jegadeesh et al. examined analysts’ recommendations as well the twelve 
considered investment variables, have the ability to predict future returns. A positive 
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relation exists for analysts’ recommendations and explanatory variables, where the most 
striking focus is on momentum stocks with a strong past performance which is expected 
to continue in the future. Although the authors showed that most recommended stocks 
have outperformed least recommended stocks.  
(Jegadeesh et. al., 2004) 
 
2.4 Publications 2011 - 2016 
Souček and Wasserek (2014) study uses as a primary data source Thomson Reuters 
I/B/E/S database and the analyzed period ranging from 2000-2012, with a focus on the 
German DAX 30 Index. Based on a sample of 12,998 observations, made by 1,446 from 
126 security firms, the aim of the paper is to study the impact of analysts’ 
recommendation upgrades, downgrades and reiterations on the stock returns and if 
investors are able to profit from those recommendations.  
 
Souček et. al. contribute to the academic literature as this study is the first research on 
analysts’ recommendations on the German DAX and for a more recent time frame. In 
addition, the paper analyses compared to Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) the price 
reactions of all recommendations. 
 
Excess return calculation is based on the approach of the famous theoretical Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) and controlling of other factors and to test the robustness, the 
Fama-French (1997) three factor model, as well the Carhart (1997) four factor extension 
model was applied. 
 
The recommendation sample contains 41.7% of buy recommendations, 39.1% of hold 
and surprisingly a large amount of 19.2% sell recommendations. This gives evidence that 
the analysts’ recommendations frequency distribution is compared to the US findings less 
biased. Recommendation change, 5 x 5 transition matrix shows the bulk of 
recommendations are in the upper 3 x 3 part and illustrates clearly that sell 
recommendations are less frequent than buy recommendations. 
 17 
Recommendation changes to upgrades accumulated significantly positive abnormal 
returns around the recommendation release date, while recommendation downgrades 
accumulated significantly negative returns. The same return patterns apply for initial 
recommendations, a new buy recommendation gains significantly positive returns, 
whereas significantly negative returns hold and sell recommendations accumulate. No 
statistically significant returns and market reactions were obtained by recommendation 
reiterations. Further as confirmed from previous papers, the paper provides evidence that 
the stock market reaction on recommendation revisions is most powerful at the 
announcement day and the post-recommendation drift in stock prices last up to six months 
for upgrades and four months for downgrades. Due to the findings that the stock market 
reaction is strongest at the recommendation release date, the analysis give further 
evidence that investors are able to gain the highest profit from analysts’ recommendations 
by trading on the event day in a timely manner. 
(Souček et al, 2014) 
Years ranging from 1996 to 2012 were analyzed by Boulland, Ornthanalai and Womack 
in the research paper "Speed and Expertise in Stock Picking: Older, Slower and Wiser?" 
with the aim to examine how the speed of recommendation changes have investment 
value. The study contributes to the literature as it is one of the first study that examines 
the impact of analyst’s decision speed-style on the stocks, analysts are following and by 
looking on the investment value by classifying analysts into two types according to their 
speed. 
 
The final sample for the period 1993 to 2012 uses I/B/E/S database, which contained 
240,957 observations. Overall the sample contains solely recommendation changes, 
upgrades (44.54%) and downgrades (55.46%).  
 
Descriptive statistic for the sample shows an average of a recommendation stay without 
a change is 12.36 months and analysts are following on average 6.91 stocks. 
The paper calls the time or the speed it takes to revise analyst’s recommendation as 
turnover. Further analysts can be classified into two categories, fast-turnover analysts, 
who change their recommendations on average every 6 months and slow-turnover 
analysts who typically change their opinion approximately every 20 months. The study 
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uses Barber et. al. (2001) famous real-calendar time portfolio approach, which is in the 
academic literature the standard approach in assessing abnormal returns of buy vs. sell 
recommendations. Boulland et. al. found that recommendation changes made by slow-
turnover analysts have significantly outperformed by 1.93% in the first five months after 
the recommendation change, relative to fast-turnover analysts. While risk-adjusted 
returns of downgrades are by 1.23% relatively lower. A multivariate regression analysis, 
with analysts' recommendation speed-style as the dependent variable and various 
analyst’s characteristics as independent variables delivered strong evidence for the 
relation between analyst’s ability to make better recommendations and their decision-
speed. The coefficients of analyst’s characteristic variables top brokerage house, 
experience and analyst’s all-star category have significantly negatively effects on the 
dependent variable fast-turnover group, further indicates slow-turnover analyst’s ability 
to make more careful and better decisions. In summary, the paper demonstrates better 
recommendations are made by slow-turnover analysts and those add value for investors 
through their prudent decision style.  
(Boulland et. al., 2016) 
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3 Research Methodology  
This section provides information about the methodology by explaining the database, the 
time period of the analysis, the selected equity index, the rating scale classification and 
the research design. 
 
3.1 The Data Selection 
The analyst recommendations used in this study were obtained from the financial data 
provider Bloomberg. The recommendation time frame encompasses the period 2000 to 
2017 with a solely focus on the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIA). One of the 
significant reason for choosing the DJIA, is as it shows the performance of the industrial 
sector within the American economy and contains the 30 largest and mainly important 
publicly owned companies based in the United States. The companies listed in the DJIA, 
are attached in table 10 in the Appendix. 
 
The recommendations had to fulfil some criteria to be included in the entire data sample:3 
- At least one analyst who has issued a recommendation on a specific stock and 
reconsidered the opinion within 365 days. If a recommendation exceeds the time 
window of 365 days, it will be seen as a new recommendation, in order to avoid 
outdated recommendations with no reference to previous one. 
- Recommendations issued when the American Stock Exchange (AMSE) and the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is closed are eliminated to ensure availability 
of stock returns on all trading days, as the DJIA is quoted at the end of every US 
trading day.  
 
Consequently, to create the sample of recommendation upgrades and downgrades the 
following criteria were additionally imposed for the sample to be used in the event study 
and cross-sectional regression analysis: 
- Recommendations are excluded if an analyst makes only one recommendation, as 
those recommendations have no reference to change in recommendations. 
                                                 
3 Criteria selection follows the approach by Stickel (1995), Jegadeesh et al (2010) and Souček et al 
(2014). 
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- Recommendation revisions of previous recommendations are excluded, since 
recommendations on securities issued by the same analysts are classified as 
upgrades or downgrades compared to the previous announced recommendations. 
 
In the event study and cross-sectional regression analysis, buy recommendations are 
defined as all rating upgrades to a strong buy and buy coming from a recommendation of 
hold, sell or strong sell. Sell recommendations are defined as all downgrades in 
recommendation revision to strong sell and sell, coming from a rating of strong buy, buy 
or hold. Including recommendation downward revisions to hold from a strong buy or a 
buy recommendation.  
 
All recommendations which are present the first time in the data sample, are treated as 
recommendation initiation. This might be not the true initiation of coverage. This 
assumption is relevant in order to start with the analysis. 
 
The stock prices data will be looked up on Bloomberg. For all 30 DJIA securities the 
official daily closing price is chosen, after the adjustment of capital market events like 
stock-dividends, dividend pay-out and mergers and acquisitions. For each security, the 
corresponding stock price return is calculated as the natural logarithm difference in the 
closing price over the one day period as follow: 
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝐿𝑛 [
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
] 
 
This approach is the most acceptable method in finance to model asset prices and the 
main benefit of using log-returns instead of arithmetic returns in modeling assets prices 
is to avoid the occurrence of negative assets prices, as asset prices never take prices less 
than zero. Since in academic finance the process of a stock price St at time t is modelled 
as a stochastic process, which is called geometric Brownian motion (GBM), a further 
advantage is the assumption of normally distributed log-returns. This can be opposed as 
the price of a security follows a GBM (Hilber, 2017). 
  
 21 
3.2 Rating Scale 
‘Buy’, ‘hold’ and ‘sell’ are the most commonly used and known expressions by security 
analysts. However, from broker to broker houses analysts use slightly different 
expressions for the same meaning, for example ‘attractive’, ‘neutral’, ‘market-perform’ 
or ‘underweight’, see table 11 in Appendix. 
 
As the sample consists of 131 different rating expressions as the individual brokerage 
firms use a variety of different rating phrases for their stock recommendations, all 
expressions have to be analyzed and standardized and coded into a common rating 
system. 
 
To ensure comparability of recommendations across brokerage firms, the study make use 
of the common 5-point scale rating system. The different analyst’s recommendations 
were classified into a common rating scale from 1 to 5. Where rating 1 is a ‘Strong buy’, 
2 is a ‘Buy’, 3 is a ‘Hold’, 4 is a ‘Sell’ and 5 is a ‘Strong sell’. Rating 6 ‘No coverage’ 
was attached when the analyst coverage was terminated. 
 
Some expressions contain two rating phrases, a firm and an industry recommendation 
separated by a slash. The used rating expression in this analysis, is solely the firm 
recommendation, which is the text before the slash.  
 
3.3 Research Design 
It is imperative that this study requires mainly quantitative analysis in extent to answer 
the addressed research question. The methodology of this master thesis will consist of 
different steps.  
 
The first step will be the review of all recommendations in the sample period and 
standardizing the expressions into a common rating scale, by attaching numerical 
numbers to all recommendation expressions. Subsequently, the data sample will be 
analyzed by applying descriptive statistics on all recorded recommendations exported 
from Bloomberg. Proceeding with the analysis, only changes in recommendations are 
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used, which means any revisions of previous recommendations are excluded. Continuing 
the impact of recommendation changes on stock prices will be analyzed by applying the 
methodological concept of an event study. The last step conducts a cross-sectional 
regression analysis to determine the performance of recommendation revisions. 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To begin with the quantitative analysis, the entire data sample will be analyzed by using 
descriptive statistics.  
 
As a first step, a table with annual descriptive statistics which include per year the number 
of firms covered, number of analysts and number of brokerages, which should give 
information’s about the annually average number of analysts covering firms and average 
number of analysts employed at a brokerage house, as well the average number over the 
entire sample period.  
 
Secondly, I will analyze the frequency distribution of the recommendations classified 
among three rating categories buy, hold and sell. Whereas category buy encompasses 
strong buy and buy recommendations and the category sell encompasses sell and strong 
sell recommendations.  
 
Thirdly descriptive statistics of analysts' recommendations is going to be conducted for 
each DJIA firm separately. Descriptive statistics for each firm aims to break down the 
number of analysts following a company, number of brokerages per company and the 
average rating for each firm and their median respectively. The motivation is to find out, 
if brokerage houses tend to cover the top level of large capitalized firms, if a specific 
sector is attractive to follow and for which firm analysts are issuing most highly (least) 
recommendations. 
 
Finally, all possible changes in analysts' recommendations are going to be examined with 
a 5 x 5 recommendation change matrix. The purpose of the matrix is to show where the 
bulk of recommendations are clustered and to deliver the number of upgrades and 
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downgrades. The matrix will give insight if more upgrades or downgrades occurred in the 
encompassing sample period. 
 
3.3.2 Event Study and Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis   
The quantitative analysis in assessing the price performance of analysts’ 
recommendations will be examined by the usage of the commonly known event study 
concept and a cross-sectional regression analysis. This master thesis builds upon the event 
study methodology, which is widely accepted and was applied in previous literature, like 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Stickel (1995), Womack (1996) and Souček et al. 
(2014).  
 
The event study methodology is used to investigate the share price reaction following the 
recommendation changes. The methodological approach used in this master thesis 
follows the event study methodology described by Bowman (1983). This methodological 
concept is also known under the names such as residual analysis and abnormal 
performance index tests. 
 
To start with an event study, the structure of an event study involves the following steps, 
according to Bowman (1983) and De Jong (2007) described structure of an event study:  
 
I. Identify the event of interest and precisely the timing of the event. 
The event of interest in this master thesis is the investigation of recommendation 
revisions, which occur for different securities at different calendar dates. To begin with, 
the timing of the event has to be identified. The timing of the event equals to the exact 
announcement day of the recommendation as recorded by the Bloomberg database. 
Consequently, all different calendar dates of all single events need to be standardized to 
event time zero (𝑡 = 0), as the aim is to bring all single events together into a single 
sample. This event time procedure allows to describe time periods in event time relative 
to the zero time when the event, the recommendation revisions occurred. The figure below 
shows the time line of an event study.  
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Figure 1: Time Line of an Event Study. 
 
In this study, the time period of the estimation window right before the event window 
ranges from 𝑇1 = −180 𝑡𝑜 𝑇2 = −40, following the length of the estimation window 
from Brown and Warner (1980) classical event study paper. The information content 
event window in the analysis was expanded to include days before the announcement 
date, due to the uncertainty of the announcement date of the analysts’ recommendations. 
This encounters the likelihood that an investment bank or brokerage house research 
departments informs specific target clients on any recommendation changes prior to the 
date of the research report and prior to the announcement date in the Bloomberg database. 
According to the Ethical and Professional Investment Standards of the CFA Institute 
(2017) all clients of an investment bank or brokerage house must have a fair chance to 
act on every recommendation, nevertheless following the guidance it is acceptable to 
communicate any recommendations to clients first who pay for a different service level. 
Therefore, it is useful to extend the event window around the event date to capture a pre-
event drift before the actual announcement date. The chosen event period ranges from 
𝑡1 = −20 𝑡𝑜 𝑡2 = +120 and follows the time line structure of two event studies, as 
Stickel (1995) showed, a pre-event drift occur twenty days before the event and Womack 
(1996) findings showed the post-event drift might last up to 6 months after the event. 
 
II. Calculate normal returns based on a specified benchmark model for 
normal share price behavior in order to assume the event had not taken 
place. 
The second step requires the specification of an appropriate benchmark to calculate and 
model normal stock return behavior. The S&P 500 Index is used as a benchmark index, 
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since the S&P 500 includes all stocks tracked in the DJIA index and the S&P 500 is one 
of the broadest benchmark index which tracks the 500 largest US corporations. The 
selection of the S&P 500 as a broad index in this study to represent the market portfolio 
aligns with Womack and Zhang (2003) suggestions to select either the S&P 500 or the 
Russell 2000 index. 
 
Next step requires the selection of a statistical model to calculate the residuals of the 
process generating returns. Referring to Bowman (1983) the correct model is a critical 
element in event studies to be able to find security price reactions. In this study, the widely 
accepted single factor model, called market model is chosen: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where the parameters are as follow, Rit is the return on security i in period t, Rmt is the 
return on the market portfolio, the selected market benchmark in period t, coefficients 𝛼 
and 𝛽 are constants for security i. The coefficient beta 𝛽𝑖 or slope of the regression, 
measures the sensitivity of return Rit with the reference market and returns have to be 
adjusted for differences in beta, since the market sensitivity for each stock is not equal to 
one. The parameter 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term or residual of the market model, which is 
completely a random part of the model.  
 
The calculation of normal returns is performed over the estimation period ranging from 
the start  𝑇1 = −180 up to the end 𝑇2 = −40. From the above model, normal returns can 
be mathematically derived as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 
 
Subsequently the parameters of the model are estimated by using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression method. The next step involves the calculation of residuals based on the 
estimated parameters ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖. This means abnormal returns can be expressed as 
residuals or error terms of the market model: 
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𝜀?̂?𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
 
According to Bachmann (2015a) and (2015b) residuals expectation and OLS estimation 
assumptions are the following: 
 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁  
 
This means on average the expected value of abnormal (excess returns) has to be zero and 
holds in an efficient market environment, where no excess returns can be achieved. This 
means any non-zero value in residuals is termed as abnormal (excess) returns, since the 
expected value of the residuals is assumed to be zero on average, according to the above 
equation. 
The second property states a zero correlation, as it is assumed the error term is not 
correlated with the market return Rm and security return Rit is uncorrelated with security 
return Rjt. This property is also referred as no autocorrelation in residuals, see Bachmann 
(2015f). 
 
𝜎(𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑗𝑡) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
 
Last required OLS estimation assumption is homoscedasticity, which means all error 
terms have the same variance.  
 
𝑉(𝜀𝑖) = 𝜎
2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 
 
This assumption is violated if the variance of the error terms is not constant and depends 
on the values of the independent variables used in the regression model, referred as 
heteroscedasticity. Consequently, a violation of the assumption means that the OLS 
standard errors 𝑠𝑏𝑜, … , 𝑠𝑏𝑘 are incorrect and could be either too low or too high. 
A graphical inspection, by the usage of residual plot helps to detect whether outliers and 
heteroscedasticity is present. This approach is of limited use as these residual plots do not 
provide evidence of that problem. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct statistical tests. 
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Statistically, heteroscedasticity can be assessed by running a Breusch-Pagan test or a 
White test. The Breusch-Pagan test runs under the following hypothesis: 
 
𝐻0: 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝜎
2 
 
𝐻1: 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸(⟨𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖1, … , 𝑥𝑖𝑘⟩) 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test requires the estimation of the so-called auxiliary regression 𝑒𝑖
2 =
𝑎0 + 𝑎1?̂?𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖. Consequently, by the use of a chi-squared test statistic it can be decided 
whether to reject the null hypothesis or not if: 
 
𝑛 ∗ 𝑅2𝑒2  > 𝜒
2
1,𝛼 
 
where 𝜒21,𝛼  is the critical value of a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom and 
confidence level 𝛼. (Bachmann, 2015e) 
 
III. Calculate abnormal (excess) returns in the determined event window. 
Step three involves the calculation of abnormal returns, where abnormal returns (AR) are 
calculated as actual returns (R) minus normal returns (NR) in the event window ranging 
from t1 to t2. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 
 
Where Rit is the return on stock i on day t and NRit is defined as the expected return in the 
estimation period. The determination of abnormal returns is performed over the event 
window ranging from 𝑡1 = −20 to 𝑡2 = 120 and the event date is labelled in event time 
as 𝑡 = 0, as outlined in the first step. Therefore, ARi0 represents abnormal return on the 
event date and ARit represents abnormal return on t periods (days) after the event. 
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Due to the fact that there are multiple events4 for each firm present, the relative events 
are treated as if they belong to separate firms. Assuming the used sample is of size N, a 
matrix of abnormal returns can be constructed in the following form: 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡1 … 𝐴𝑅𝑁,𝑡1
⋮ … ⋮
𝐴𝑅1,−1 … 𝐴𝑅𝑁,−1
𝐴𝑅1,0 … 𝐴𝑅𝑁,0
𝐴𝑅1,1 … 𝐴𝑅𝑁,1
⋮
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡2
…
…
⋮
𝐴𝑅𝑁,𝑡2 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Each matrix column presents a time series of abnormal returns for stock i, where the time 
index t is counted from the event date (t=0). Each row builds a cross-section of abnormal 
returns for each time period. 
 
Proceeding with the analysis, abnormal returns need to be organized and grouped into 
two portfolios, either buy or sell portfolio according to the relative event if it is either an 
upgrade or downgrade in the recommendation revision. 
 
Subsequently the abnormal returns are averaged to improve the information content of 
the analysis over the observations together. Below equation expresses average abnormal 
returns (AAR) at time t across all observations under studies. 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For illustration table 12- Event Counts per Company - included in Appendix stores the total number of 
events for each firm.  
 29 
The total impact of an event, measured during the event period t1 to t2 is examined through 
cumulating individual abnormal returns to obtain cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
from the start of the event period t1 up to time t2, as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡1 + ⋯+ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
 
The last step involves the calculation of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR), 
which means the CARs are aggregated over the cross-section of events. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
Where N equals the number of observations in the respective buy or sell portfolio and t 
refers to the number of aggregated time periods.  
 
IV. Use significance tests to test if abnormal (excess) returns are statistically 
significant. Analyze the results. 
The final step requires to test whether the abnormal returns, CAAR are statistically 
significant from zero with a given significance level. The stated null hypothesis to be 
tested is the following:  
 
𝐻0: 𝐸(𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡) = 0 
 
the null hypothesis of no abnormal return is tested by using the most common and simple 
t-test. This test assumes the t-test statistics follows a Student-t distribution with 𝑁 − 1 
degrees of freedom and builds on a normally distribution. To achieve a reliable t-test 
statistic it is important to check whether the residuals (abnormal returns) are normally 
distributed. As the Central Limit Theorem states, large samples will follow approximately 
a standard normal distribution, abnormal returns used in this study are expected to follow 
a standard normal distribution, since the number of cross-section events is quite large. 
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Hence, abnormal returns need to be checked and a histogram of the abnormal returns is 
drawn. Figure 6 shows the residuals are fairly normally distributed and this was verified 
by using the Stata command sktest, which is a normally distribution test based on 
skewness and on kurtosis. Then the computed t-test statistic is compared to a critical t-
value with the appropriate degrees of freedom to check whether the results are significant 
at less than 0.10, 0.05 or 0.01 significant level. Lastly, the results need to be analyzed and 
interpreted.  
 
 
Defining independent variables 
After calculating the impact of change in recommendations on the share price 
performance a cross-sectional regression analysis is used to investigate the determinants 
of the stock price performance of recommendations and to test the imposed hypothesis. 
As outlined the regression model uses cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as dependent 
variable and the returns are regressed on selected independent variables. The applied 
regression analysis to describe the cumulative abnormal returns orientates itself on the 
different addressed hypothesis. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: Change in recommendations for corporations with low coverage have a  
greater positive impact on prices compared to corporations with high 
analyst coverage. 
 
The third hypothesis aims to answer the effect of analyst coverage on returns. The 
literature stated the negative relation between coverage and returns exists for small firms. 
While Sahut (2011) observed returns for firms covered by more analysts are less volatile, 
whereas when the number of analysts is decreasing the volatility on returns are increasing, 
respectively. The question arises if this relation as a result of information asymmetry also 
holds for large capitalized stocks. One would expect revisions in recommendations have 
a similar effect likewise for small firms, which means a company with a low analyst’s 
coverage experience a larger price reaction and a company with a high analyst coverage 
a lower price reaction.  
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The regression model incorporates analyst coverage (COVERANALYST) as independent 
variable. This explanatory variable equals the mean number of analysts who made a 
recommendation change during the sample period. The coefficient on COVERANALYST 
was hypothesized to be negative for buys and positive for sells as a higher coverage, leads 
in return to lower positive and negative abnormal returns. 
 
 
Hypothesis 4: Analysts are able to add value through finding overpriced and underpriced 
securities. 
 
Issued buy recommendations by analysts come a long with analyst believes that the 
assessed company is undervalued by the market and a sell recommendation that the 
company is overvalued in the market. According to Stickel (1995) prices should react 
more to strong buy and strong sell, as those securities are considered to be even more 
undervalued and overvalued respectively.  
 
To test this hypothesis, the regression model includes the dummy variable STRONG to 
assess the strength in recommendation revisions on prices.  The coefficient STRONG 
takes the value one if recommendations are upgraded to strong buy and zero for upgrades 
to buy. Due to the limited amount of strong sell recommendations, the dummy variable 
STRONG equals one for recommendation downgrades to strong sell or sell and zero for 
downgrades to hold. The coefficient on the dummy variable STRONG for upgrades to 
strong buy is expected to be positive and the dummy variable STRONG for downgrades 
is expected to be negative, as it is predicted that changes to strong buy and strong sell 
should have a greater positive and a greater negative impact on prices, respectively. 
 
When analysts revise their recommendations in a way that recommendation skip a rank, 
the revision is expected to have a greater impact on the price of a security. Referring to 
Stickel (1995) a change from hold to strong buy incorporates a greater change in 
expectation compared to a change from buy to strong buy. The revision from hold to 
strong buy means that the analyst is believing the security is even more undervalued. 
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To test this hypothesis, the regression model includes as independent variable, the dummy 
variable SKIPRANK, which equals one if the characteristic the revision in 
recommendations skips a rank is observed. If the revision of recommendations does not 
skip a rank, the dummy variable takes the value zero otherwise. It can be expected that 
the coefficient on the dummy variable SKIPRANK should be positive for buy 
recommendations and negative for sell recommendations. 
 
  
Hypothesis 5: Analysts do more upgrades in recommendations when investor  
sentiment is high and more downgrades when investor sentiment is low. 
 
The purpose of the fifth hypothesis is to investigate the relation between stock 
recommendations upgrades and downgrades with investor sentiment. Prior literature, like 
Hilary and Shon (2007) and Bagnoli, Clement and Crawley (2009) confirmed a positive 
relation between stock recommendations and market sentiment exists. Bagnoli et al. 
(2009) found in their research, recommendations issued by analysts are more favorable 
on average in bullish markets when investor sentiment is high.5 This correlation is also 
supported by Kaplanski and Levy (2010) findings, their time series analysis confirmed 
analysts issue more optimistic recommendations when investor sentiment is positive6, 
while the contrary takes place when investor sentiment is negative. Further researchers, 
Corredor, Ferrer and Santamaría (2011) have confirmed the robustness of the correlation 
between analysts’ recommendations and investor sentiment, as those researchers have 
shown it is not only in the US market present it also holds across four main European 
stock markets. 
 
                                                 
5 Bagnolli et al. (2009) further finding is that those recommendations which are positively correlated with 
investor sentiment are less profitable. The sources of lower profitability can be either (1) by a smaller impact 
of investor sentiment on stock prices or (2) by analysts missing capability to correctly incorporate investor 
sentiment into their recommendations. This result is a strong signal for analysts to focus on fundamental 
analysis (cash flows, earnings and discount rates), rather than trying to capture investor sentiment to make 
profitable recommendations. 
6 Kaplanski et al. (2010) additionally found a correlation between investor sentiment and herding among 
analysts. This means analysts’ recommendations are not only positive with high investor sentiment, 
further they are also more homogenous during this market environment. The opposite holds true when 
sentiment is negative. 
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To test if this hypothesis is valid throughout the sample period and to assess herewith the 
impact on the stock price, the regression analysis incorporates the dummy variables 
MARKETTYPE and TRADINGSIGNAL. MARKETTYPE, equals one if the characteristic 
change in recommendation occurred in an upward moving market referred as bull market 
and takes the value zero if the change in recommendation occurred in a downward moving 
market referred as bear market. The dummy variable TRADINGSIGNAL signal captures 
market sentiment by the usage of a technical trading strategy over the volatility index 
(VIX). When a recommendation was revised during times where the short-term moving 
average crossed the long-term moving average the dummy variable equals one (buy 
signal) and zero (sell signal) otherwise, when the long-term moving average crossed the 
short-term moving average. This means when it takes the value one, the market is in an 
upward moving trend, investors are bullish and market sentiment is expected to be high 
and zero otherwise when the market is in a downward moving trend and market sentiment 
is expected to be low, respectively.  
 
 
Hypothesis 6: Change in recommendations for stocks with high brokerage coverage have  
a greater impact on prices than stocks with lower brokerage coverage. 
 
To test if this designated hypothesis is valid, the regression analysis includes 
COVERBROKER as independent variable, which equals the mean number of brokers who 
covered a stock. The coefficient is expected to be positive for buys and negative for sells. 
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4 Empirical Results 
This chapter provides empirical results for all statistical analysis as described in the 
previous chapter. The first section of this chapter, starts with the results of the descriptive 
statistics on the entire recommendation sample. The following sections show the event 
study and the cross-sectional regression results to answer the imposed hypothesis three to 
five and the addressed research question. Finally, in the last section, an additional test 
will be conducted in order to analyze if the trading volume differ significantly at the event 
date. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To begin, table 1 provides annual descriptive statistics on analyst recommendations for 
the years 2000 through 2017. Column (3) shows the number of analysts providing 
recommendations has increased from 269 in 2000 to 537 in 2017. In this data sample, the 
DJIA was on average by 499 analysts covered during the sample period. The same 
development applies for the number of brokerage houses in column (4), since the number 
of brokerage houses has increased consistently from 58 brokerage firms in 2000 to a high 
of 100 brokerage firms in 2017. The entire sample period records on average 96 brokerage 
firms. Column (5) shows the mean number of analysts employed per brokerage house. As 
the number of brokerage firms were increasing, the mean number of analysts per 
brokerage has increased subsequently. Since the mean number can be distorted from 
larger institutions like J.P. Morgan, Credit Suisse, Barclays, UBS, Morning Star and 
Morgan Stanley who employ on average between 20 to 30 analysts, the median provides 
better information on analysts per brokerage house. Column (6) indicates the median 
number of analysts has increased from two per brokerage in 2000 to three analysts per 
brokerage in 2017. Over the entire period the median number shows three analysts were 
working in a brokerage house. Column (7) shows the mean number of analysts following 
a firm has increased across the time period from 12 analysts to almost 30 analysts and the 
median number of analysts from 11 to 28, respectively. These numbers are in line with 
the findings of Welch (2000) and Michaely et al.  (2002a) who observed in their research 
that a firm is followed on average by 20 to 30 analysts. In contrast to these results, Souček 
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et al. (2014) found in their descriptive statistics firms in the German Dax are on average 
covered by 16.85 analysts during the period 2000-2012. 
 
 
Table 1: Annual Descriptive Statistics on the DJIA Analysts’ Recommendations sample 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The first designated hypothesis stated analysts are more reluctant to issue sell 
recommendations. To check whether this hypothesis is valid, the distribution of analysts’ 
recommendations was analyzed and descriptive statistic was used across the sample 
period.  
 
Figure 2 demonstrates graphically the distribution of analysts’ recommendations over the 
examined time frame from 2000 to 2017. It can be clearly seen that analysts tend to 
provide mostly buy and hold recommendations rather than a sell or a strong sell 
recommendation. Strong buy recommendations decreased surprisingly in 2000 from 15% 
to 5% in year 2002 and make up a minority amount as the recommendation percentages 
per year is in line with a strong sell recommendation. The extensive decline in strong buy 
Year Number Number of Number    Analysts per Brokerage  Analysts per covered firm
of Firms Analysts of Brokerages Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000 29 269 58 4.64 2 12.14 11
2001 29 389 72 5.4 2 17.28 15
2002 29 435 96 4.53 2 19.90 19
2003 29 463 99 4.68 2 20.48 18
2004 29 446 91 4.90 2 19.59 18
2005 29 473 88 5.38 3 21.55 21
2006 29 437 92 4.91 3 19.66 19
2007 29 415 83 5.00 2 19.34 18
2008 30 428 88 4.86 2.5 19.43 18
2009 30 527 103 5.12 3 25.41 23
2010 30 554 111 4.99 3 25.93 24
2011 30 584 108 5.41 3 28.03 27
2012 30 615 111 5.49 3 29.57 27
2013 30 598 110 5.49 3 29.10 27
2014 30 625 103 5.95 3 31-34 30
2015 30 603 99 5.97 3 29.50 27
2016 30 589 107 5.45 3 29.77 28
2017 30 537 100 5.37 3 27.47 28
   Overall average 499.28 95.50 5.20 3.00 23.64 22
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recommendation by 66.67% is the result of NASD 27117 and NYSE  4728 rules on 
brokerage houses to disclose their recommendation distributions. This further disclosure 
requirements also contributed to a shift in recommendations, where the percentage of buy 
recommendations increased from 2002 onwards. The graph shows a pattern between buy 
recommendations and hold recommendations, the graph clearly indicates over time, when 
buy recommendations are increasing, hold recommendations are decreasing. The 
opposite is true when hold recommendations are increasing, buy recommendations are 
decreasing, respectively. Referring to chapter three Research Methodology, this 
development can be caused by the positive relation between market sentiment (investors 
mood) and analysts’ recommendations. Ample research reports showed over time, 
analysts’ recommendations are more opportunistic when investor sentiment is high, as 
quoted in the previous chapter three Research Methodology. Surprisingly this graph 
contradicts partially with the positive correlation, just by viewing on the below graph, as 
it shows in years ranging 2000-2001 where investor sentiment was high, a decrease in 
buy recommendations started already. This does not mean that the positive correlation, 
which is reported by the literature, is rejected. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Analysts’ Recommendations over time period 2000 to 2017  
Each line presents the corresponding recommendation’s weight in relation to the total amount of recommendations. 
                                                 
7 See http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403\&element_id=3675 for further 
detailed information. 
8 See http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403\&record_id=16349 for further 
detailed information. 
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Table 2 provides statistics on the recommendations included in this research study. Per 
year the number of recommendations, the number of covered firms, the number of 
brokerage houses issuing recommendation reports and the average rating. The average 
rating follows the rating scale from 1 to 5, where rating 1 is a ’Strong buy’ and rating 5 
means a ’Strong sell’, respectively. Additionally, the ratings are composed into three 
categories Strong Buy/ Buy, Hold and Sell/ Strong Sell. The absolute amount of 
observations per category and the percentage of total recommendations by years are 
presented. The number of covered firms is constant across the sample period, since the 
focus is solely on all recommendations on the DJIA. For the entire period covered by this 
research the sample includes 12,389 recommendations, where a rating from 1 to 5 was 
issued, made by 270 different brokerage houses. Remarkable is how the amount of 
analysts’ recommendations has doubled from 351 in 2000 to 806 in 2017. It can be seen 
that analysts have provided more positive recommendations in the early 2000s, where 
category Strong Buy/ Buy make more than 60% of the recommendations. This pattern 
normalized after the implied new rules on research in connection with investment banking 
activities, whereas as a result Hold recommendations increased by a compounded annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 29.03%, precisely from 26.50% to 44.12% in 2002. Overall Sell/ 
Strong Sell increased from 1.42% and remained stable at a lower level of 6.82% in 2017.  
 
  
Table 2: Annual Descriptive Statistics on the DJIA Analysts’ Recommendations by category  
Number of Number of Number of Average Median                                    R ecommendation Frequency
Year Recommendations Firms Brokerage Rating           Strong Buy/Buy            Hold       Sell/Strong Sell
Houses N % of Total N % of Total N % of Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
2000 351 29 58 2.14 2 253 72.08% 93 26.50% 5 1.42%
2001 502 29 72 2.21 2 334 66.53% 161 32.07% 7 1.39%
2002 578 29 96 2.55 3 277 47.92% 255 44.12% 46 7.96%
2003 587 29 99 2.50 2 303 51.62% 252 42.93% 32 5.45%
2004 548 29 91 2.44 2 323 58.94% 198 36.13% 27 4.93%
2005 604 29 88 2.38 2 373 61.75% 208 34.44% 23 3.81%
2006 563 29 92 2.44 2 326 57.90% 207 36.77% 30 5.33%
2007 560 29 83 2.39 2 339 60.54% 201 35.89% 20 3.57%
2008 581 30 88 2.44 2 333 57.31% 218 37.52% 30 5.16%
2009 732 30 103 2.41 2 448 61.20% 253 34.56% 31 4.23%
2010 764 30 111 2.34 2 510 66.75% 238 31.15% 16 2.09%
2011 825 30 108 2.35 2 545 66.06% 255 30.91% 25 3.03%
2012 870 30 111 2.45 2 497 57.13% 337 38.74% 36 4.14%
2013 862 30 110 2.51 2 450 52.20% 368 42.69% 44 5.10%
2014 905 30 103 2.53 2 462 51.05% 392 43.31% 51 5.64%
2015 871 30 99 2.55 2 445 51.09% 367 42.14% 59 6.77%
2016 880 30 107 2.55 2 443 50.34% 380 43.18% 57 6.48%
2017 806 30 100 2.55 2 413 51.24% 338 41.94% 55 6.82%
Overall 12,389 29.56 270 2.43 2 7,074 57.10% 4,721 38.11% 594 4.79%
2.507123 11.90909
2.080084
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In total on average 57.10% Strong Buy/ Buy, 38.11% Hold and 4.79% Sell/ Strong Sell 
recommendations were issued on the securities included in the DJIA. Those numbers are 
in line with most research studies, where all U.S. outstanding recommendations on 
securities were examined. As expected and in consistent with prior literature, Elton et al. 
(1986)9, Stickel (1995)10, Barber et al. (1998)11, Willis (2004)12 and further literature, the 
number of Sell/ Strong Sell recommendations, category Sell/ Strong Sell (designated 
rating 4 and 5), building a minority in comparison to the total amount of analysts’ 
recommendations. In contrast to the prior mentioned literature which deliver similar 
results is Souček et al. (2014) findings where sell recommendations make up 19.20% of 
the total recommendation sample on securities included in the German Dax. 
 
The sample in my study showed that strong buy and buy recommendations make the 
majority of recommendations and occur more frequently than sell and strong sell 
recommendations. This observation clearly confirms hypothesis one that analysts are 
issuing predominantly optimistic recommendations and analysts hesitance to issue more 
negative recommendations in form of a strong sell or a sell recommendation is evidently 
reflected in the data.  
 
Michaley et al. (2002a) explain these biases in recommendations by the fact that analysts 
are facing pressure to report and reiterate positive recommendations on covered firms 
with which the investment bank has either an existing client relationship or intents to 
build a relationship with a potential client. Further both researchers state the impact of 
negative recommendations hits an investment banking business activities in the future, as 
the company where a negative recommendation is issued will most likely switch to 
another investment bank. Moreover, the risk of an incorrect sell recommendation is much 
higher than an incorrect buy recommendation for an analysts and investment banks 
                                                 
9 Elton et al. (1986) examined in their research during the time period 1981-1983 a distribution of 48% of 
Strong Buy/ Buy and 2% of Strong Sell/ Sell recommendations. 
10 Stickel (1995) research showed for the analyzed time frame 1988-1991 a recommendation frequency 
distribution 55% in category Strong Buy/ Buy, 33% of Hold and 12% of Sell/ Strong Sell 
recommendations. 
11 Barber et al. (1998) Research examined in the time frame from 1986-1996 a recommendation 
frequency distribution of 55% of Strong Buy/ Buy, 33% of Hold and 6.3% of Sell/ Strong Sell 
recommendations. 
12 Distribution of recommendations included in Willis et al. (2004) research for the time frame 1993-1999 
shows 58.2% Strong buy/ buy; 35.6% are hold and 6.2% of the recommendations are Sell/ Strong Sell. 
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reputation. Therefore, due to the higher risk of a wrong anticipated outcome of a 
recommendation, it is expected according to Souček et al. (2014) that sell 
recommendations are issued less frequently. 
  
According to Michaley et al. (2002a) the bias of analysts to issue sell recommendations 
is called “optimism bias” and both researchers have observed in their study a ratio of 10 
buy recommendations to 1 sell recommendation throughout their sample period. In this 
research on average a ratio of 13 Strong Buy/ Buy recommendations to 1 Sell/ Strong sell 
recommendation throughout the time frame 2000-2017 is observed. 
  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The second hypothesis stated that analysts are following large capitalized corporations 
and largely covering certain attractive sectors. In comparison to most academic research 
papers, this empirical research is able to provide descriptive statistics on analyst’s 
recommendation separately to all firms included in the study as the focus is solely on 
recommendations of securities included in the DJIA index and not on all outstanding U.S. 
recommendations, which can be easily obtained from the I/B/E/S Thomson Reuters 
recommendation database.  
 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics on all securities included in the DJIA, total number 
of observations per security, weighted average rating and median rating for the years 
ranging from 2000 to 2017. Average rating, mean is based on the rating scale where a 
rating 1 follows a ‘Strong buy’, 2 a ‘Buy’, 3 a ‘Hold’, 4 a ‘Sell’ and rating 5 a ‘Strong 
sell’, respectively. From a view on the amount of recommendations for each firm, the 
table demonstrates a preference of analysts to cover firms in the information technology 
sector. The highest amount of recommendations was made on securities for instance Intel, 
Microsoft and Apple, whereas the least amount of recommendations is issued on 
industrial, material and consumer discretion sectors. Analysts made the most favorable 
recommendation on firms like United Health Group where an average rating of 2.21 was 
issued, Visa with a reported consensus average rating of 2.22, Apple with a rating of 2.24 
and a rating of 2.27 for United Technologies. The median rating, which is the midpoint 
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of the data, also confirms a clear buy for all above mentioned firms. The highest 
consensus average rating was reported for Merck & Co. and Travellers Company with a 
rating of 2.59, DuPont with a rating of 2.60, Caterpillar and Exxon Mobile with a rating 
of 2.65 and American Express with an average rating of 2.66, which almost corresponds 
to a hold. For all six firms the median rating, which separates half of the observations 
below the median and half above, corresponds to a rating of 3, which is a hold. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on all Firms included in the DJIA 
 
 
 
 
Number of     Rating per Security
Firms Industry Recommnedations Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Apple INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 618 2.24 2
American Express FINANCIALS 420 2.66 3
Boing INDUSTRIALS 389 2.52 2
Caterpillar INDUSTRIALS 349 2.65 3
Cisco Systems INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 665 2.38 2
Chevron ENERGY 377 2.46 2
DuPont MATERIALS 271 2.60 3
Disney World CONSUMER DISCRETION 479 2.46 2
General Electric INDUSTRIALS 320 2.37 2
Goldman Sachs FINANCIALS 386 2.56 3
Home Depot CONSUMER DISCRETION 432 2.41 2
IBM INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 407 2.52 2
Intel INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 685 2.50 2
Johnson & Johnson HEALTHCARE 371 2.40 2
JP Morgan FINANCIALS 443 2.36 2
Coca Cola CONSUMER STAPLES 313 2.49 2
McDonalds CONSUMER DISCRETION 358 2.50 2
3M INDUSTRIALS 269 2.46 2
Merck & Co. HEALTHCARE 389 2.59 3
Microsoft INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 632 2.32 2
Nike CONSUMER DISCRETION 344 2.35 2
Pfizer HEALTHCARE 400 2.30 2
P&G CONSUMER STAPLES 342 2.51 2
Travellers Company FINANCIALS 364 2.59 3
United Health Group HEALTHCARE 356 2.21 2
United Technologies INDUSTRIALS 324 2.27 2
Visa INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 343 2.22 2
Verizon TELECOMMUNICATIONS 545 2.53 3
Wal Mart CONSUMER STAPLES 487 2.46 2
Exxon Mobile ENERGY 358 2.65 3
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Table 4 reports information on analyst’s coverage and brokerage coverage per firm 
included in the DJIA. Column (4) represents the average number of analysts covering a 
security and column (6) represents the average number of brokerage houses per firm. The 
table shows evidently a preference of analysts to follow a certain attractive sector, since 
Apple is covered on average by 34.94 analysts, Cisco Systems by 37.22 analysts on 
average, Microsoft by 35.55 analysts on average and Intel by 38.50 analysts respectively. 
The information technology sector is overall on average by 33.79 analysts followed 
during the sample period. Whereas the coverage on the industrial sector is considerably 
lower, as General Electric is on average covered by 17.83 analysts, United Technology 
on average by 18.33 analysts and 3M with an average coverage of 15.11 analysts. 
Generally, the industrial sector is covered by 18.51 analysts during the sample period. 
Further least preferred sector is the material sector, as DuPont with an average coverage 
of 15.11 amounts the lowest average coverage of analysts. Additionally, the sector 
information technology is on average covered by a higher number of brokerage firms in 
contrast to other sectors, see column (6).  
These summary statistics are in line with the observations in table 3, where based on the 
total amount of recommendations a preference of analysts to follow a certain attractive 
sector was obviously seen.  
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Table 4: Statistics on all Firms included in the DJIA: Analyst and brokerage coverage 
 
 
Descriptive statistics on all DJIA securities confirmed hypothesis 2 that analysts follow 
large capitalized firms and have a preference to follow a certain attractive sector. The 
sample data reflects, all securities have on average an analyst coverage of at least 15 
analysts. Further, there is a preference to cover the information technology sector, as this 
sector had the highest analyst coverage, the highest brokerage coverage and as this sector 
recorded the highest amount of recommendations. 
        Number of Analysts       Number of Brokerage
Firms Industry Number M ean Number Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Apple INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 159 34.94 117 34.94
American Express FINANCIALS 100 22.89 65 23.44
Boing INDUSTRIALS 92 21.67 62 21.67
Caterpillar INDUSTRIALS 79 19.56 55 19.56
Cisco Systems INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 167 37.22 122 37.39
Chevron ENERGY 96 20.94 57 20.94
DuPont MATERIALS 64 15.11 47 15.11
Disney World CONSUMER DISCRETION 100 27.56 81 27.56
General Electric INDUSTRIALS 86 17.83 58 17.94
Goldman Sachs FINANCIALS 87 21.33 61 21.33
Home Depot CONSUMER DISCRETION 82 24.5 67 24.50
IBM INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 102 23.00 78 23.00
Intel INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 166 38.5 117 38.67
Johnson & Johnson HEALTHCARE 100 21.06 59 21.06
JP Morgan FINANCIALS 98 24.5 71 24.50
Coca Cola CONSUMER STAPLES 74 17.39 48 17.39
McDonalds CONSUMER DISCRETION 83 21.41 62 21.41
3M INDUSTRIALS 69 15.11 40 15.11
Merck & Co. HEALTHCARE 93 21.83 61 21.83
Microsoft INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 195 35.5 115 35.50
Nike CONSUMER DISCRETION 88 29.22 63 19.22
Pfizer HEALTHCARE 111 24.24 74 24.24
P&G CONSUMER STAPLES 81 19.00 54 19.00
Travellers Company FINANCIALS 90 20.22 59 20.22
United Health Group HEALTHCARE 74 20.17 50 20.17
United Technologies INDUSTRIALS 78 18.39 52 18.39
Visa INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 85 33.60 64 34.40
Verizon TELECOMMUNICATIONS 127 20.89 92 31.17
Wal Mart CONSUMER STAPLES 110 27.87 73 27.78
Exxon Mobile ENERGY 97 19.78 62 19.83
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Table 5 shows a 5 x 5 transition matrix of analysts’ recommendations, where each cell 
shows the number of recommendations revisions from an initial rating to a new rating. 
The diagonal cells of the matrix are recommendations reiterations, whereas the off-
diagonal cells present recommendation revisions. According to the imposed criteria in 
chapter three Research Methodology, this table excludes analysts’ recommendations, 
where only an initial recommendation was issued, without a revision in the sample period.  
 
It can be observed that the recommendations are clustered at the rating buy in the upper 
2 x 2 cells, which means analysts tend mostly to revise their previous announced buy 
recommendations. When a previous recommendation is a hold, analysts tend to upgrade 
a recommendation to buy, rather than to downgrade the rating of a corporation to sell.  
 
 
Table 5: 5x5 Transition Matrix of Analysts’ Recommendations  
 
The tendency of analysts to revise their previous opinions which occur more frequently 
as observed in the above table, can be explained by various research studies which address 
the herding behavior of security analysts. Agreeing with Welch (2000) there is no surprise 
why security analysts exhibit herding behavior, as all analysts have the same information 
and therefore act all in similar way. Further his findings give insight into the direction of 
recommendation revisions, since Welch (2000) observed a tendency of analysts to revise 
their recommendations towards previous recommendations than away from them. 
Herding effect investigated by Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) confirms analysts’ reluctance 
to stand out from the crowd, as their findings indicate recommendation revisions are 
partly based by analysts’ aspiration to follow the crowd. 
To Recommendation of:
From Recommendation of: (1) Strong Buy (2) Buy (3) Hold (4) Sell (5) Strong Sell Total Percent
(1) Strong Buy 179 109 65 9 0 362 3.31%
(2) Buy 98 4,661 1,107 94 2 5,962 54.44%
(3) Hold 44 1,096 2,786 180 1 4,107 37.50%
(4) Sell 5 86 187 241 0 519 4.74%
(5) Strong Sell 1 0 1 0 0 2 0.02%
Total 327 5,952 4,146 524 3 10,952 -
Percent of Total 2.99% 54.35% 37.86% 4.78% 0.03% - 100%
Upgrades (1) Strong Buy 148
(2) Buy 1182 1330
Downgrades (5) Strong Sell + 286
(4) Sell
(3) Hold 1172 1458
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4.2 Event Study Results  
Table 13 and table 14 attached in the appendix stores calculated average abnormal returns 
(AAR) for single event days ranging from 𝑡 = −20 to 𝑡 = +120 for upgrades and 
downgrades and their respective t-statistics.  
 
Table 13 reports average abnormal returns of upgrades which are throughout the time 
period positive, negative and statistically significant from zero at different significance 
levels and across different event days. Moreover, the table shows no pattern in the size of 
abnormal return and a variation at a lower marginal percentage level across the event 
days. One-tailed hypothesis test, which tested the hypothesis if AAR are significantly 
larger than zero, resulted in significant coefficients in the pre-event window at event days 
𝑡 = −17, 𝑡 = −9 to 𝑡 = −8, 𝑡 = −5 before the event date and in the post-event window 
at event days 𝑡 = +11, 𝑡 = +33, 𝑡 = +63, 𝑡 = +79 and 𝑡 = +96. The coefficients of 
negative abnormal returns resulted in various statistically significant coefficients by 
computing an additional two-tailed hypothesis test. Abnormal returns from 𝑡 = −1 to 𝑡 =
+1, which includes the event day 𝑡 = 0 resulted in positive abnormal returns which are 
not statistically different from zero. To conclude the hypothesis of no abnormal returns 
cannot be rejected before and immediately after the event happened. This means days 
before and after a recommendation announcement have not an impact on security prices 
and investors do not profit from trading according to analysts’ recommendation direction.  
 
Average abnormal returns of downgrades in table 14 points out abnormal returns are 
generally negative and statistically significant across various single event days in the pre-
event window and in the post-event window. Further one can see the coefficients of 
negative abnormal returns differ in the size across the event days and no obvious pattern 
in the magnitude is apparent. In the pre-event window before day 𝑡 = −1 there are barely 
any significant abnormal returns, besides the significant coefficient at event days 𝑡 =
−18, 𝑡 = −10 and 𝑡 = −8. Compared to upgrades, the coefficients of abnormal returns 
of downgrades are as expected, statistically significant in the event-window from 𝑡 = −1 
to 𝑡 = +1 around the event date and the hypothesis of no abnormal returns can be rejected 
at less than 0.05 and 0.01 level for both one-tailed and two-tailed hypothesis test. Negative 
abnormal returns are more negative on the event date 𝑡 = 0 compared to one day after 
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the event. The results imply recommendation announcements in the 3-day event period 
centered on the recommendation event date have an impact on security prices, 
nevertheless a less economically meaningful effect as can be seen by the lower marginal 
percentage level. To conclude the alternative hypothesis of abnormal returns cannot be 
rejected before and immediately after the event happened. 
 
 
Table 6 reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) with t-statistics over 
different event windows in ten day intervals separately for recommendation upgrades and 
downgrades.  
 
Recommendations which were upgraded are generally statistically significant in various 
time periods starting from day 𝑡 = +21 until day 𝑡 = +120. By looking on the numbers 
one can see CAAR are mostly negative across different time interval periods likewise 
table 13 showed a negative pattern in average abnormal returns. Barely three-time 
intervals 𝑡 = −10 to 𝑡 = −1, 𝑡 = −1 to 𝑡 = +1 and 𝑡 = +61 to 𝑡 = +70 resulted in 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns, whereas CAAR of the last-mentioned time 
interval is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level. In the long-term interval 
which ranges from 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +120 a significant negative post-recommendation drift 
of -3.18% is found. Comparing the observed post event drift with the reported 
recommendation drift observed by Womack (1996), the drift in this empirical research is 
surprisingly negative and not moving towards the direction of analysts’ forecasts. Overall 
in this research, no positive significant pre-event drift and no positive long-term post-
event recommendation drift is observed. 
 
Recommendation revisions which were downgraded had generally as predicted negative 
returns and abnormal returns were in most time intervals in the pre-event and post-event 
window highly statistically significant at less than 0.01 significance level. Compared to 
downgrades the coefficient of the short-term time period 𝑡 = −1 to 𝑡 =  +1 which 
includes the event date 𝑡 = 0, differ significantly from zero and the null hypothesis of no 
abnormal performance can be evidently rejected based on the high t-statistic value of t-
Stat= -5.01. To conclude in this research, the drift in the pre-event recommendation 
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window and post-event recommendation window are both negative and statistically 
significant different from zero. Moreover, the magnitude of abnormal returns is 
increasing as the event window is extended. These findings align with Womack’s (1996) 
findings, who observed a significant post-recommendation drift. 
 
Summarizing the results, barely a significant pre-event recommendation drift is observed 
for recommendation downgrades and sign of the coefficients are towards analysts 
forecasted direction. CAAR in the long-term post-event recommendation window 
ranging from 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +120 are equally for upgrades and downgrades highly 
statistically significant as can be seen by the high t-statistic value of -7.34 for buys and -
6.10 for sells respectively.  
 
 
Table 6: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns  
 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
Upgrades Downgrades
Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic
(-20, -11) -0.1093 -0.79 (-20, -11) -0.0915 -0.80
(-10, -1) 0.1227 0.89 (-10, -1) -0.2113* -1.69
(-1, +1) 0.1043 1.00 (-1, +1) -0.5229*** -5.01
(0, +10) -0.1724 -1.31 (0, +10) -0.2621** -2.04
(+11, +20) -0.5402 -0.48 (+11, +20) -0.1522 -1.58
(+21, +30) -0.3327*** -2.73 (+21, +30) -0.3075*** -2.61
(+31, +40) -0.3870*** -3.07 (+31, +40) 0.1393 1.20
(+41, 50) -0.2821** -2.50 (+41, 50) -0.4050*** -3.42
(+51, 60) -0.3739*** -2.88 (+51, 60) -0.3477*** -2.98
(+61, +70) 0.4268*** -3.20 (+61, +70) -0.2747** -2.11
(+71, +80) -0.1932* -1.88 (+71, +80) 0.0531 0.52
(+81, +90) -0.4253*** -3.53 (+81, +90) -0.1845* -1.67
(+91, +100) -0.0547 -0.45 (+91, +100) 0.0230 0.21
(+101, +110) -0.1240 -1.02 (+101, +110) 0.1845* -1.67
(+111, +120) -0.4116*** -3.85 (+111, +120) -0.4426*** -4.33
(-5, +120) -3.1834*** -7.34 (-5, +120) -2.3425*** -6.10
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Figure 3 and figure 4 plots the average stock price reaction in form of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) over the event period ranging from t1=-20 to t2=+20 centered 
on the recommendation event date. 
 
The CAR graph of recommendation upgrades shows a volatile pattern in abnormal 
returns, one can see that abnormal returns were increasing in the pre-event period from 
event-window 𝑡 = −10 to 𝑡 = −5 and two days before event day 𝑡 = 0 until event day 
𝑡 = +4 and then it reversed. Moreover, the graph shows two maximum drawdowns 
occurred during the 20-day period. The most remarkable price adjustments occur within 
the 20-day period immediately following day zero. Comparing this CAR price-drift with 
the price movement found in the literature, by surprise the upgrades CAR graph is not 
moving towards analysts revised recommendation direction in the post-estimation 
window. Further the observed increase in average excess returns before event day zero, 
is not statistically significant from zero, as can be viewed in table 15 attached in the 
appendix.  
To conclude, the graph clearly implies investors are not able to achieve excess returns 
(Alpha) by trading according to analysts’ recommendations and investors cannot gain a 
value from analysts. 
 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of Recommendation Upgrades 
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CAR graph of recommendation downgrades shows abnormal returns are negative in the 
pre-event period before the event day 𝑡 = 0 and are continuing to decrease sharply from 
event day 𝑡 = −3 forwards. This CAR pattern is highly statistically significant from zero 
at less than 0.01 significance level over then event period ranging from 𝑡 = −1 to 𝑡 =
+20, as can be seen in table 15 in the appendix where the corresponding CAR and t-
statistics are stored. 
The figure CAR of downgrades clearly indicates that recommendation revisions of 
downgrades are moving towards analysts revised recommendation direction before the 
event occurred and the post-event drift is highly statistically significant at less than 0.01 
significance level. Overall, the price reaction of sell recommendations is in line with the 
findings of Stickel (1995), who observed the pre-event drift starts in the 20-day period 
before the event.  
To conclude, the graph clearly implies sell recommendations are associated with negative 
abnormal returns, and abnormal returns start to decrease before the recommendation 
event date.  
 
 
Figure 4:Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of Recommendation Downgrades 
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4.3 Regression Analysis 
In the following cross-sectional regression analysis, buy recommendations are defined as 
all rating upgrades to a strong buy and buy coming from a recommendation of hold, sell 
or strong sell. Sell recommendations are defined as all downgrades in recommendation 
revision to strong sell and sell, coming from a rating of strong buy, buy or hold. Including 
recommendation downward revisions to hold from a strong buy or a buy 
recommendation.  
 
The following multivariate OLS regression was estimated separately for recommendation 
revisions combined in the buy portfolio and recommendation revisions included in the 
sell portfolio. The hypotheses were tested on the below cross-sectional regression 
equation, which regresses cumulative abnormal return of stocks in the event window 
[𝑡1 , 𝑡2] as dependent variable against selected independent variables as explained in 
section three Research Methodology. 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐴𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑇 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐾𝐼𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐾
+ 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐵𝑅𝑂𝐾𝐸𝑅 +  𝜀 
 
The results are reported for short information content window [−5,+5] and for long 
information content window [−5,+120] whereas the respective selection aims to capture 
the short-term and long-term price performance. As discussed in section three Research 
Methodology days before the event date need to be included to account for the likelihood 
of earlier dissemination. The regression equation is also conducted across different event 
windows ranging from [−10, −1], [−1, +1] and [0, +10], to capture if the results holds 
across varying time periods which include the event date. 
 
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in the buy and sell 
regressions. For buy recommendations the means of CAR are surprisingly negative in 
most event periods and not statistically significant. The means of CAR are only positive 
for CAR(-10, -1)  CAR(-1, +1), at a lower percentage level. For sells, the means of CAR(-5, +5)  
CAR(-5, +120), CAR(-10, -1)  CAR(-1, +1) and  CAR(0, +10) are -0.60%, -2.30%, -0.30%, -0.48% 
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and -0.24%. All means are significantly different from zero at less than 0.05 and 0.01 
level and increasing in the magnitude from short-term to long-term event window. As 
stated in the table, abnormal returns for buys was calculated based on 1,002 observations 
and based on 1,188 observations for sells. 
 
 
Table 7: Distributions of dependent variables used in the regression analysis 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 
level and *** indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
 
 
Table 7 shows the distribution of independent dummy variables used in the cross-
sectional regression analysis. Barely 11% of the buy recommendations were strong buy 
recommendations, whereas almost 18% of the sell recommendations were downgraded 
to either strong sell or sell. The percentage amount of recommendations that skipped a 
rating rank is for buy recommendations 8.18% and for sell recommendations 10.27%, 
respectively. As expected more recommendations were upgraded in the bull market phase 
and remarkably the similar applies for recommendation downgrades. The dummy 
variable TRADINGSIGNAL shows a balanced distribution for both recommendation 
upgrades and downgrades across upward moving and downward moving market trends. 
Number of
Variable Observations Mean t-Statistics p-value Minimum Fisrt Quarter Median Third Quarter Maximum
Buy recommendations
CAR (-5, +5) 1,002 -0.0012% -0.0081 0.5032 -18.18% -2.42% 0.13% 2.48% 18.92%
CAR (-5, +120) 950 -3.0576% -6.8267 1.0000 -63.41% -10.36% -3.16% 5.18% 10.81%
CAR (-10, -1) 1,002 0.0638% 0.3908 0.348 -46.81% -2.29% -0.08% 2.30% 54.24%
CAR (-1, +1) 1,002 0.0904% 0.8547 0.1965 -20.00% -1.25% 0.10% 1.58% 16.54%
CAR (0, +10) 1,002 -0.1611% -1.2104 0.8868 -19.43% -2.34% -0.26% 2.07% 22.04%
Sell recommendations
CAR (-5, +5) 1,188 -0.6028% -3.8751*** 0.0001 -56.84% -3.00% -0.38% 2.27% 21.68%
CAR (-5, +120) 1,127 -2.2967% -6.0055*** 0.0000 -63.65% -9.30% -2.43% 5.27% 6.71%
CAR (-10, -1) 1,188 -0.2981% -2.1800** 0.0147 -52.10% -2.52% -0.21% 2.08% 19.83%
CAR (-1, +1) 1,188 -0.4779% -4.2937*** 0.0000 -17.38% -1.96% -0.28% 1.15% 43.10%
CAR (0, +10) 1,188 -0.2416% -1.8720** 0.0307 -23.41% -2.36% -0.10% 1.99% 21.88%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Distributions of independent dummy variables 
Definitions of variables: 
The dummy variable STRONG takes the value one if a recommendation is either revised 
to strong buy for upgrades and zero otherwise (buy). For sell recommendations the 
dummy equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold). 
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero 
otherwise (do not change a rank).  
For upgrades and downgrades in recommendations, the dummy MARKETTYPE equals 
one if recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear 
market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL, equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short 
and long-term moving average cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the 
cross of both moving averages signaled sell. Buy signal is often viewed as an indicator of 
an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as a downward moving market.  
 
 
In order to determine whether the data meets the regression assumptions and to ensure 
the validity of the regression model, several regression diagnostics were conducted. One 
important diagnostic is to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity in residuals. 
Consequences of the problem are biased standard errors, which in turn leads to bias test 
statistics and impacts the consequent significance values (Williams, 2015). 
 
The following figure 5 for the buy regression which uses CAR (-5, +120) over the long-term 
event window [−5,+120], points out the variance of residuals exhibits 
heteroscedasticity, which means the variance of the error term is not uniformly distributed 
and a non-random pattern in residuals is apparent. The width for some 𝑥𝑖 values is for 
some residuals considerably larger than for others.   
       Upgrades           Downgrades
0 1 0 1
STRONG 89.03% 10.97% 82.24% 17.76%
SKIPRANK 91.82% 8.18% 89.73% 10.27%
MARKET TYPE 16.35% 83.65% 14.98% 85.02%
TRADING SIGNAL 56.23% 43.77% 53.54% 46.46%
COVER_BROKER 70.89% 29.11% 72.11% 27.89%
YEAR2001 95.11% 4.89% 96.72% 3.28%
YEAR2002 95.91% 4.09% 91.25% 8.75%
YEAR2003 94.62% 5.38% 95.20% 4.80%
YEAR2004 93.62% 6.38% 95.71% 4.29%
YEAR2005 91.58% 8.42% 95.88% 4.12%
YEAR2006 95.11% 4.89% 95.12% 4.88%
YEAR2007 95.12% 4.88% 95.96% 4.04%
YEAR2008 94.22% 5.78% 93.86% 6.14%
YEAR2009 90.93% 9.07% 93.43% 6.57%
YEAR2010 91.82% 8.18% 95.20% 4.80%
YEAR2011 92.32% 7.68% 93.69% 6.31%
YEAR2012 96.01% 3.99% 90.97% 9.03%
YEAR2013 94.82% 5.18% 90.91% 9.09%
YEAR2014 95.01% 4.99% 94.02% 5.98%
YEAR2015 92.72% 7.28% 92.93% 7.07%
YEAR2016 94.72% 5.28% 94.28% 5.72%
YEAR2017 94.62% 5.38% 0.00% 100.00%
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Figure 5: Residuals versus fitted values of the regression model using CAR(-5, +120) 
 
The similar pattern is present in four different regression models which use different event 
window, ranging from [𝑡1, 𝑡2] as mentioned earlier. Graphical inspection for buy and sell 
regressions is pointed out in figure 7 and figure 9 attached in the appendix. Figure 8 and 
figure 10 which plotted residuals squared against fitted values, further indicates the 
presence of heteroscedasticity as the squared residuals increase in magnitude as the fitted 
values increases. To verify whether the variance of error terms is not homoscedasticity a 
formal test is computed, namely the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weissberg heteroscedasticity 
test. The performed specification test aims to test under the null hypothesis that error term 
has a constant variance. The test output confirms heteroscedasticity, as the performed test 
rejects the null hypothesis with 99% confidence as indicated by the large chi-square test 
statistic, see figure 11 in appendix. The reason for heteroscedastic error term lies in the 
nature of securities due to the evidence that some securities are more volatile than others 
and exhibit a higher variance from the higher sensitivity to the overall market. For that 
reason, analytic weights of abnormal returns are used, which means abnormal returns 
with a high variance receive a lower weight. This is easily done by the statistical software 
Stata by applying the robust command and herewith by computing robust standard errors. 
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Correlation matrix are used to detect any multicollinearity in independent variables, as 
the assumptions of an OLS regression are violated if two or more variables are perfectly 
correlated. The below table 9 points out the variables COVERANALYST and COVERBROKER 
are highly correlated with each other. Referring to Bachmann (2015d) a correlation 
coefficient around 0.8 might signal problems, since it might cause multicollinearity, 
which in turn leads to unreliable estimators. Therefore, two separate regressions were run 
and one regression each excludes the variable COVERBROKER and the variable 
COVERANALYST. The correlation matrix of the independent variables for the regression 
analysis of buy and sells can be found in table 17 and 18 attached in the appendix.  
 
 
Table 9: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables, upgrades and downgrades sample 
 
Subsequently no autocorrelation in residuals need to be ensured, as any correlation in 
errors leads to biased OLS standard errors, unreliable test statistics and unreliable 
significant values. As a consequence, the null hypothesis is rejected too often, even when 
the null hypothesis is true. The recommendation change database exhibits cross-sectional 
dependence in events, since the revisions of analysts’ recommendations are clustered and 
occur mostly in the same time period. By using the cluster command in Stata any cross-
sectional and time-sectional autocorrelation is easily corrected. The technical implication 
behind is an adjustment of the standard error of the OLS estimators, as Stata uses 
automatically robust standard errors. 
 
Another important aspect is identifying unusual and influential data points. Figure 12 and 
figure 13 in the appendix indicates some potential outliers are present as in every plot 
some data points are far away located from the rest of the data points. To prevent any 
biases in the regression coefficients and overall results, observation points which deviates 
significantly from the average cumulative return will be excluded. After performing 
ALL
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG -0.0074 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0208 0.3122 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0276 -0.0784 -0.0526 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL -0.0112 0.0317 -0.0041 -0.4252 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7965 -0.0151 0.0001 0.0495 -0.0187 1.0000
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regression diagnostics, verification and corrections of the OLS assumptions, the 
estimators are consistent, the regression results are unbiased and can be presented and 
interpreted. Subsequently, several regression output results are described to answer 
hypothesis three to five. The regression results for upgrades and downgrades are stored 
in tables, which are attached in the appendix. 
 
 
Results Hypothesis 3  
Hypothesis three indicated that change in recommendations for corporations with low 
analyst coverage have a greater price impact on prices compared to corporations with 
higher analyst coverage. In order to test this hypothesis, the regression includes the 
independent parameter COVERANALYST. So far, the negative correlation between 
coverage and return is known from the literature. Hence, the coefficient is expected to be 
negative for buys and positive for sells. This means a higher coverage leads to lower 
positive and lower negative abnormal returns due to the higher amount of information’s 
is made available from analysts and the reduced information asymmetry. 
 
Table 19 show the regression results for recommendation upgrades and table 21 for 
recommendation downgrades, respectively. When looking at the regression output table 
19, the coefficient of COVERANALYST is generally as predicted negative for upgrades in 
recommendations and statistically significant at the 0.10 level in the long-term model (2) 
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level in model (5). In model (4) the sign of the 
coefficient in the event period 𝑡1 = −1 to 𝑡2 = +1 reversed and is different compared to 
the other models at a much lower economically meaningful percentage level.  
The coefficient of the independent variable COVERANALYST is in some models’ positive 
and in some models’ negative for sell recommendation revisions, as pointed out by table 
21. In contrast to upgrades, the positive coefficients of COVERANALYST are neither in 
model (1) and model (4) significantly different from zero. 
Overall the results conclude, hypothesis three can be partially accepted. This means, 
hypothesis three can be only accepted for upgrades and restricted to the time interval 
[−5,+120] and [0, +5]. The regression output indicates lower positive CAR is predicted 
when a stock is upgraded, which is covered by more analysts. For downgrades the 
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regression output delivers no statistical evidence for lower negative abnormal returns 
when the stock is covered by more analysts. Hence, it is not clear if a higher analyst 
coverage leads to lower negative abnormal returns and hypothesis three has to be rejected 
for downgrades. 
 
 
Results Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis four stated that analysts are able to add value through finding overpriced and 
underpriced securities. To test the hypothesis the regression incorporates two independent 
dummy variables STRONG and SKIPRANK. The hypothesized effect of the dummy 
variable STRONG is that recommendation revisions to strong buy or strong sell should 
have a greater impact on stock prices than a change to buy or sell. The dummy 
SKIPRANK captures the price effect of upgrades and downgrades if one rank is skipped, 
whereas the price effect is expected to be larger if a rank is skipped due to the larger 
change in expectations. Therefore, it can be expected that both estimates of these 
dummies to be positive for buys and negative for sells.  
 
Table 19 and table 20 shows the coefficient of variable STRONG of recommendation 
upgrades are negative across all different event windows and not positive as predicted. In 
both regression outputs the coefficients of the long-term model (2) and model (5) are 
statistically significant at less than 0.05 and 0.01 significance level. These results 
conclude recommendation upgrades to strong buy have a negative impact on prices than 
upgrades to buy. In the short-term model (1), which used CAR over the event period 𝑡 =
−5 to 𝑡 = +5, upgrades have a marginal percentage effect of -0.90 on prices and even a 
higher negative impact of -3.34 in the long-term model (2). The negative impact on prices 
is increasing in the magnitude as the event-window is increasing, as can be seen in table 
19 and table 20.  
The regression output tables 21 and 22 for downgraded recommendations points out 
downgrades to strong sell and sell have generally a greater price impact than downgrades 
to hold and the coefficient of the dummy variable STRONG is mostly negative as 
predicted. Besides in model (5), where the coefficient is positive at a lower percentage 
level. Comparing the coefficients of the short-term model with the coefficients of the 
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long-term model, the tables show the negative impact is increasing in magnitude as the 
event window is extended. Model (1) which uses CAR(-5, +5) has a marginal percentage 
impact of -0.12 and model (2) which uses CAR(-5, +120) has a marginal percentage impact 
of -1.59 on prices. 
 
When looking at the coefficients of the dummy variable SKIPRANK in the regression 
outputs of downgrades, one can see the coefficients are predominantly negative as 
predicted across all models. The tables of recommendation upgrades, show positive 
coefficients across all models. Revised recommendations to sell that skip a rank have a 
marginal percentage effect of -0.46 on price over the event period 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +5 and 
buy recommendations that skip a rank have a marginal percentage effect of +0.52 on 
prices. In the event period 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 =  +120, buy recommendations have a marginal 
percentage effect of +2.62 and sell recommendations have a marginal percentage effect 
of -0.04. The positive marginal percentage impact on prices for upgrades is increasing in 
magnitude when the event period is extended, as the coefficients of the short-term model 
(1) have an impact of +0.52 and the long-term model (2) have a marginal effect of +2.62 
on prices. For downgraded recommendations that skipped a rank, the results show a 
negative higher effect on prices in the short-term model compared to the long-term model. 
 
To conclude the results of downgrades are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts are 
able to find overvalued securities as the results showed downgrades to strong sell and sell 
resulted in greater negative price impact than downgrades to hold. However, the 
implication if a security is downgraded to strong sell need to be even more overvalued 
compared to a downgrade to sell and downgrades skipping a rank have a larger negative 
price effect, is statistically not proven by the achieved regression results.  
 
Contrarily the hypothesis of analysts’ ability to find undervalued securities is supported 
only by the explanatory dummy variable SKIPRANK. The results of the dummy variable 
STRONG do not support the implication when a stock is upgraded to strong buy, the 
stock is even more undervalued and should result in higher price effect compared to an 
upgrade to buy. As outlined by the negative coefficients and therefore resulting in lower 
abnormal returns. Just when a rank is skipped the implication of higher price effect is 
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supported and the magnitude of the price effect was increasing as the event period 
increased. Nevertheless, the positive coefficients are not statistically significant. To 
conclude, a recommendation which is upgraded to strong buy and recommendation 
upgrades skipping a rank, results in higher positive effect is statistically not proven by the 
achieved regression results. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to accept the 
hypothesis of analysts’ stock picking ability to find undervalued securities.  
 
 
Results Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis five specified analysts do more upgrades in recommendations when investor 
sentiment is high and more downgrades when investor sentiment is low. To test the 
hypothesis the regression uses two proxy dummy variables MARKETTYPE and 
TRADINGSIGNAL.  
 
Previously table 8 gave insight whether there are more upgrades in recommendations 
when investor sentiment is high, when the market is in an upward trend and more 
downgrades in recommendations after the market is in a downward trend. Referring to 
the results of the table, the distribution of dummy variable MARKETTYPE shows 83.65% 
of upgrades in analyst recommendations occurred during bull markets and 16.35% during 
bear markets. The results of analyst recommendation downgrades reveal the same results, 
as most recommendations were downgraded in upward trending markets and not as 
predicted in downward trending markets. Just by looking on the distribution of 
recommendation revisions across two market types the hypothesis is only partially 
supported. The results of recommendation upgrades are in line with the results of Bagnoli 
et al. (2009) and Kaplanski et al (2010), who found a positive correlation between investor 
sentiment and recommendation revisions. Both researchers found analysts issue more 
optimistic recommendations in form of recommendation upgrades when investor 
sentiment is high. The negative relation between low market sentiment and higher 
negative recommendation changes cannot be supported by the variable MARKETTYPE, as 
just 14.98% of recommendation downgrades occurred when the markets were in a 
downward trend. The inconsistent results for downgrades might lie in the nature of market 
type, as across the sample period an upward trending market (bull market) is spread over 
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171 months compared to a downward trending market (bear market) is spread over 47 
months. In contrast to this result, the negative correlation that analysts issue more sell 
recommendations when investor sentiment is negative can be supported by the dummy 
variable TRADINGSIGNAL, as more downgrades occurred when the market is in a 
downward trend which counts for 53.54% of sell recommendations. 
Overall, the results for upgrades and downgrades are in favor of hypothesis five by 
combining the results of both dummy variables which capture market sentiment in two 
different approaches.  
 
Coming to the regression results of the dummy variables MARKETTYPE and 
TRADINGSIGNAL and their respective effect on price.  
 
As previously examined more upgrade in recommendations occurred when investor 
sentiment is high when the market was upward trending referred as bull markets and the 
coefficients of MARKETTYPE are throughout the table 19 and table 20 generally negative 
across different event periods. Moreover, the coefficients are statistically different from 
zero at less than 0.05 and 0.01 significance level. The marginal negative impact on prices 
is even increasing in the magnitude as the event period increases. In the short-model (1) 
upgrades have a marginal effect of -1.23 compared to a high marginal effect of -6.20 in 
the long-term model (2). These results are in line with Bagnoli et al. (2009) results, who 
found that those recommendation which are positively correlated with investor sentiment 
are less profitable. The implication of the received results is, too many unprofitable 
recommendation upgrades occurred, which might have overestimated market sentiment 
or incorporated market sentiment not accurately into their recommendation revisions. 
 
Table 21 and table 22 shows the coefficient of MARKETTYPE for recommendation 
downgrades is mainly negative across all event periods and the negative impact is 
significantly increasing in the magnitude as the event period is increasing. The marginal 
percentage effect on price is -0.10 in the short-model (1) and the effect is increasing in 
the size to -3.01 in the long-term model (2). Furthermore, the coefficient in the long-term 
model is statistically different from zero at less than 0.05 significance level. These results 
imply the price effect of downgrades is larger and more negative when recommendations 
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were downgraded in upward trending market (bull market) compared to downward 
trending market (bear market). 
 
To conclude, the results indicate analyst recommendation upgrades during upward 
trending markets are less profitable and analyst recommendation downgrades during this 
market phase have a larger negative effect and by following these sell recommendations 
investors are able to reduce the loss on a security. This imply analysts should take an 
anticyclical view, which means when investor sentiment is high according to bull market 
phase, analysts should not hesitate to downgrade stocks based on fundamental and 
justified research. 
 
The results of market sentiment captured by the dummy variable TRADINGSIGNAL shows 
as expected positive impact on price for upgrades and generally negative impact on price 
for downgrades throughout the different event periods.  
For recommendation upgrades the marginal percentage effect is decreasing in the 
magnitude from the short-model (1) to the long-term model (2) and statistically 
significant at less than 0.01 significance level in the event period 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +5. The 
results show a positive impact on price, when analysts do upgrades, when the dummy 
variable shows a buy signal. This indicates larger positive price performance in upward 
trending market.  
Equally table 21 and table 22 reports generally negative coefficients for the variable 
TRADINGSIGNAL, which means when the trading signal is buy, the impact on prices is 
negative in the short-term event period 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +5 and positive as expected in the 
long-term event period 𝑡 = −5 to 𝑡 = +120. In the long-term model (2) the coefficient 
confirms a positive marginal percentage effect on price when the market is in an upward 
trend signaled by a buy trading signal. Contrarily a larger negative marginal percentage 
effect on price when the market is in a downward trend and herewith signaled by a sell 
trading signal. This implies the performance of recommendation downgrades are greater 
negative in downward trending markets than in upward trending market. 
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These results, confirm for upgrades a larger positive price effect in upward trending 
markets and for downgrades a larger negative price effect in downward trending markets, 
as captured by the dummy variable TRADINGSIGNAL. 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis six aims to analyze the impact of brokerage coverage on the price 
performance of upgrades and downgrades. The hypothesis states recommendation 
revisions for stocks with higher brokerage coverage have a greater impact on prices than 
stocks with lower brokerage coverage. The coefficients of upgrades are expected to be 
positive, which in turn leads to higher positive abnormal returns and the coefficients for 
downgrades are expected to be negative, which leads to higher negative abnormal returns. 
 
By looking on the regression output results which include the independent variable 
COVERBROKER one can see the coefficients are throughout the tables generally negative 
for upgrades and downgrades. The results for sell recommendations are as predicted 
negative for sell recommendations and statistically different from zero at less than 0.10 
significance level in the event period 𝑡 = 0 to 𝑡 = +10. The negative coefficients for 
upgrades are statistically significant in the long-term model and in model (5) at 0.10 and 
0.01 significance level. To conclude, the results indicate lower abnormal returns for 
recommendation upgrades and greater negative abnormal returns for recommendation 
downgrades. Generally, a higher broker coverage for upgrades and downgrades, have a 
less economically meaningful effect on prices, since the coefficients vary a lot and are at 
a lower percentage level.  
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Overall regression results 
The performed regressions for upgrade in recommendation revisions and downgrade in 
revisions, show in all different event periods a low R-squared, which indicates the used 
explanatory variables in the model do not explain very much in the variation of the 
dependent variables CAR. The R-squared which is the coefficient of determination varies 
in all models at a lower level between 0.002 to 0.035. The lowest and highest R-squared 
numbers can be viewed in tables 20 and 22. The R-squared results are consistent with 
prior studies like Stickel (1995) who received a R-squared of 0.01 across all used event 
periods. 
 
The F-test statistics which tests if all parameters are equal to zero or not indicates in most 
cases that not all of the variables are equal to zero at a 0.01 and 0.10 significant level and 
the regression model of upgrades is significant as a whole. The statistical significant 
results imply the included explanatory variables make sense to be included in the model 
despite the low R-squared results. F-statistic values can be found in the respective 
regression output tables for upgrades and downgrades in recommendation.  
 
  
 62 
4.4 Abnormal Trading Volume 
Ample research publications found the trading volume of securities differ significantly 
across various announcements, which means an event has an impact on the volume of the 
respective securities traded.  
 
Likewise, in the research of investment value of analysts, Womack (1996) found the 
trading volume around the event date differs significantly compared to the average trading 
volume. To test if this anomaly is present in the data sample of this empirical research, 
an additional test of abnormal trading volume is conducted. The formula is based on 
Womack’s (1996) recommended formula for abnormal trading volume.  
 
𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑖
(∑ 𝑉𝑡
𝑖 +−61𝑡=−2 ∑ 𝑉𝑡
𝑖61
2 ) ∗
1
120⁄
 
 
 
Abnormal volume (AV) for each security in the sample of upgrades and downgrades is 
calculated as a ratio of the trading volume V of security i relative to each event day t, to 
the average trading volume. The average trading volume is calculated 60 trading days 
before and 60 trading days after the event and by excluding the event window 𝑡 = −1 to 
𝑡 =  +1. To proceed the mean of all observations i at time day t in the upgrades and 
downgrades sample is calculated.  
 
Figure 6 and 7 shows abnormal trading volume surrounding event days in the event 
window 𝑡 = −20 to 𝑡 = +20, centered around the reported recommendation event date.  
 
Both graphs show in the pre-event period and in the post-event period, trading volume is 
for both upgrades and downgrades at 1.0 when trading volume is normal. Similarly, for 
upgrades and downgrades abnormal volume is increasing in magnitude before the event 
and decreasing after the event. The peak in abnormal volume is reached exactly on the 
event day, when the recommendations were announced. The average trading volume on 
the recommendation event date is 170% of normal for upgrades and 175% of downgrades. 
Furthermore, abnormal volume is on each event day statistically significant at less than 
0.01 significance level and is herewith statistically different from normal. By looking on 
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both graphs, one can see abnormal volume for recommendation upgrades and downgrades 
do not differ significantly.  
 
To conclude the results in this research, align with Womack (1996) findings, who 
documented significant volume reactions and showed the average trading volume for buy 
recommendation is about 190% and for sell recommendation is about 300% of normal 
trading volume. 
 
 
Figure 6: Abnormal Trading Volume, Upgrades 
 
 
Figure 7: Abnormal Trading Volume, Downgrades  
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5 Conclusion and Outlook 
This master thesis analyzed analysts’ recommendations issued from brokerage firms on 
the securities included in the DJIA by performing descriptive statistics, applying the event 
study method to analyze security price reactions and by applying a cross-sectional 
regression analysis. The purpose of this research is, to analyze the imposed research 
question “Do Analysts Recommendations have Investment Value”, which questions if 
investors derive a value from these recommendations issued from analysts.  
 
It is particular of interest to analyze the investment value of analysts during the time 
period ranging from 2000 to 2017, as previously conducted research publications have 
shown that analysts add value. These results are evidently contradicting with the efficient 
market hypothesis, which states if the semi-strong and the strong form hypothesis holds 
that no excess return can be achieved by fundamental analysis since all the information 
is already priced in. Since share prices immediately incorporate all public and private 
information, neither technical nor fundamental analysis has any value in stock selection 
ability to investors.  
 
Therefore, this empirical research analyzed in the main part of this master thesis, the 
impact of recommendation revisions on stock prices, which means only changes in 
recommendations from a previous recommendation to a new recommendation are 
analyzed, issued from the same analyst on the same security. This approach excludes any 
recommendation reiterations, since recommendations issued are classified as either 
recommendation upgrades or recommendation downgrades. Referring to the literature 
this approach allows to determine analysts’ ability to detect the extend of mispricing in 
securities. 
 
Looking at the frequency distribution of all recommendations, which fulfilled the criteria 
to be included in the entire data sample, it could be derived that analysts are issuing more 
optimistic recommendations and less frequently sell recommendations. This bias of 
analysts to issue more positive recommendations is referred to as ,,optimistic bias”. The 
data resulted in a ratio of thirteen “Strong buy/ Buy” recommendations over one “Sell/ 
Strong sell” recommendation. Further a preference of analysts to cover large-capitalized 
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companies is observed, as all companies are on average covered by at least 15 analysts. 
Moreover, the sample showed analysts have a preference to cover a certain attractive 
sector, namely the information technology sector, as this sector is covered on average by 
33.79 analysts and further has the highest coverage by brokerage firms, compared to other 
sectors.  
A 5 x 5 transition matrix of analysts’ recommendations revealed the previous observed 
results of optimistic recommendations, as a large amount of recommendations are 
clustered at the rating buy, which gave insights that analysts often tend to revise their 
previously issued recommendation. Further the matrix showed a tendency of analysts to 
upgrade a recommendation rather than to downgrade a recommendation, coming from a 
hold rating. This behavior is not a surprising pattern, as it is commonly known that 
analysts exhibit a herding behavior, due to the fact that all analysts have the same 
information and therefore act in a similar way as it appears to be less risky to follow the 
crowd than to behave differently. 
 
The results of the event study aimed to analyze the security price reactions in form of 
abnormal returns before the recommendation announcement, which is the event date, and 
after the event date. Excess returns were calculated by using the market model, which is 
commonly applied in the analysis of security price performance. Recommendation 
upgrades resulted in neither a significant positive pre-event drift, nor in a positive and 
significant post-recommendation drift. Further in a short event interval [−1,+1], which 
includes the event date, showed no significant abnormal returns and therefore the 
announcement is not impacting security prices. Contrarily recommendation downgrades 
showed negative and significant abnormal returns in the event window [−1,+1] centered 
on the event date. Further recommendation revisions, which were downgraded had 
generally predicted negative returns and resulted in significant pre-event recommendation 
and post-recommendation drift.  Recommendation downgrades are associated with a -
2.31% post recommendation drift over the long-term event window [−5,+120].  
To conclude, the results of abnormal returns for upgrades showed that investors are not 
able to achieve excess returns by trading according to analysts’ recommendations and 
investors cannot gain a value from analysts. Further the long-term post-recommendation 
drift is negative and not moving towards analysts’ forecasts. Recommendation 
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downgrades are associated with negative abnormal returns and are moving towards 
analysts forecasted direction, as abnormal returns start to decrease two days before the 
recommendation event date.  
By looking on the results, the findings confirm investors are able to minimize their loss 
on securities by trading according to analysts’ forecasts. Nevertheless, the real value of 
sell recommendations is questionable, due to the low frequency of strong sell and sell 
recommendations.  
 
The cross-sectional regression analysis analyzed factors that contribute to the stock price 
performance of recommendation revisions, by looking on the short-term and long-term 
performance and across different event windows. The final recommendation revisions 
sample included 1,002 buy recommendations and 1,188 sell recommendations, covering 
30 securities included in the DJIA, made by 886 analysts from 180 brokerage houses. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for buy recommendations are associated with an average 
decrease of -3.06% and sell recommendations with an average decrease of -2.30% in the 
long-term event window.  
The impact of different explanatory variables on price performance of recommendation 
revisions were analyzed, namely the strength of the recommendation revision, the 
magnitude of the recommendation revision by whether the recommendation revision 
skips a rank, the impact of recommendation upgrades and downgrades during a market 
type (bull market vs. bear market) and the impact on performance when recommendations 
are either upgraded or downgraded during upward or downward moving markets 
according to a technical trading strategy.  
The results showed a positive correlation between market sentiments, as more 
recommendation upgrades occurred during a market phase, when the market sentiment 
was high. Furthermore, more recommendation downgrades occurred during downward 
trending markets, according to the technical trading approach. The hypothesis of analysts’ 
stock picking ability to detect underpriced and overpriced securities, imposed any 
changes to strong buy or strong sell and recommendation upgrades and downgrades 
skipping a rank, should result in higher positive and higher negative abnormal returns, 
respectively. The findings showed that downgrades to strong sell or sell have a greater 
impact than downgrades to hold, but the results are not statistically significant. 
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Furthermore, the results of changes in recommendations that skip a rank have a larger 
price effect than changes that do not skip a rank, both for upgrades and downgrades in 
recommendations. Nevertheless, there is no statistical evidence. To conclude based on 
the statistical results, there is no evidence to accept the hypothesis of analysts’ stock 
picking ability, in order to pick stocks which are undervalued and should result in higher 
abnormal returns and stocks which are overvalued, which should result in higher negative 
abnormal returns. 
 
Overall, the results of the event study which analyzed security price reactions and the 
results of the cross-sectional regression analysis come to the result that analysts do not 
have investment value for investors. There is no evidence that investors can have an added 
value by trading towards analysts’ recommendations, as shown by the event study and 
the cross-sectional regression analysis which exhibited neither evidence for greater 
positive price performance when recommendations were revised to strong buy, nor a 
greater negative price performance when recommendations were revised to strong sell. 
Consequently, the question arises why the financial sector employs thousands of analysts 
whose job is to track corporations and issue recommendation opinions on their securities, 
based on a fundamental and pro-found research. As this research showed that investors 
do not gain an added value in form of positive abnormal returns, one needs to ask why 
analysts are still present and what is their real output. 
 
Moreover, the results of the analysis of abnormal trading volume, resulted in significant 
above average trading volume before and after the event date, for upgrades and 
downgrades. which imply analysts have a significant effect on the volume traded of the 
respective securities, centered around the recommendation event date. 
 
An assumption why banks still employ analysts, is connected to their investment banking 
activities. Analysts are involved in the process to position a potential corporation in the 
initial public offering (IPO) process on capital markets. Despite the fact that a Chinese 
wall is between the equity research team and the investment banking team, analysts are 
needed to analyze independently the equity story of a potential IPO candidate and its 
respective equity story. Furthermore, equity analysts do not have data from the investment 
 68 
banking team and have only access to publicly available information, which allows them 
to propose an independent book building range based on an outside valuation view, which 
is not based on data received from the respective corporation. Moreover, a bank’s 
investment banking business needs equity analysts, as those analysts are viewed as an 
independent channel to speak with investors. Proceeding in an IPO process, equity 
analysts are the front people who start to speak with potential investors and are supporting 
market equities of the equity sales team in the trading division of an investment bank. 
When a corporation was successfully listed on a stock exchange, an analysts’ task is to 
conduct ongoing research for the corporation and their respective industry. Due to the 
fact, that the investment bank aims to keep the relationship with the respective 
corporations and to avoid any decline in future investment banking business activities, it 
is no surprise why analysts face pressure to issue optimistic recommendations and show 
herding behavior, to avoid damage on their reputation and on the reputation of the 
investment banking business of their bank. 
 
As the results of this empirical study showed a preference of analysts to follow 
corporations in the information technology sector, it would be motivating to build up on 
my research and to analyze why this sector has a much higher analysts’ coverage 
compared to other sectors. In my point of view, it would be interesting to analyze if this 
sector needs a higher analysts’ coverage in order to increase the efficiency as the 
technology industry is more difficult to understand than industrials sector. 
 
Further it might be interesting to extend this study, by analyzing price and volume 
reactions of analysts’ recommendation revisions separately for small-capitalized, mid-
capitalized and large-capitalized companies. In order to identify if significant price and 
volume reactions between small and large companies might exists. Due to the fact, that 
large companies have a higher analysts’ and brokerage coverage, which in turn leads to a 
larger extend of information available to investors. Therefore, it can be expected to 
investigate significantly larger price reactions for smaller companies, due to the higher 
information asymmetry and the higher risk and return differences between small-
capitalized and large-capitalized companies.  
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Additionally, it might be interesting to conduct this research on the main European equity 
markets, to investigate if there are differences within Europe and if there are differences 
between the European and the US equity market, with regard to analysts’ behavior, 
market and volume reactions. 
For further research, I would recommend investigating whether analysts’ behavior can 
positively influence an investment banks underwriting business. And to what extend the 
relation between an analyst and the respective followed companies, contributes to the 
investment banking business. 
X 
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 XVI 
1) 3 M (MMM) 
2) American Express (AXP) 
3) Apple (AAPL) 
4) Boeing BA) 
5) Caterpillar (CAT) 
6) Chevron (CVX) 
7) Cisco Systems (CSCO) 
8) Coca-Cola (KO) 
9) DuPont (DD) 
10) Exxon Mobil (XOM) 
11) General Electric (GE) 
12) Goldman Sachs (GS) 
13) Home Depot (HD) 
14) IBM (IBM) 
15) Intel (INTC) 
16) Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) 
17) JP Morgan (JP) 
18) MC Donalds (MCD) 
19) Merck & Co. (MRK) 
20) Microsoft (MSFT) 
21) Nike (NKI) 
22) Pfizer (PFE) 
23) Procter & Gamble (PG) 
24) Travellers Companies (TRV) 
25) United Technologies (UTX) 
26) United Health Group (UNH) 
27) Verizon (VZ)  
28) Visa (V) 
29) Wal-Mart (WMT) 
30) Walt Disney (DIS) 
Table 10: Companies included in the DJIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 XVII 
Recommendation Rating 
Strong buy 1 
Long-term buy 1 
above average 1 
aggressive buy 1 
long-term attractive 1 
short-term strong buy 1 
top pick 1 
Overwt/Attractive 2 
overwt/positive 2 
buy 1 2 
Outperform 2 
Overweight 2 
Sector Outperform 2 
market outperform 2 
buy 2 
Attractive 2 
Positive 2 
Accumulate 2 
buy/attractive 2 
Buy/Neutral 2 
overwt/neutral 2 
Trading buy 2 
Add 2 
buy 2 2 
moderate outperform 2 
recommend list 2 
focus list 2 
gradually accumulate 2 
industry outperform 2 
market outperform 2 
outperf/attractive 2 
positive 2 
short-term accumulate 2 
short-term buy 2 
short-term market outperform 2 
short-term outperform 2 
speculative buy 2 
speculative outperform 2 
Near-term buy 2 
overwt/in-line 2 
outperf/cautious 2 
outperf/neutral 2 
 XVIII 
overwt/cautious 2 
overwt/in-line 2 
overwt/negative 2 
buy/cautious 2 
sector perform 3 
Market Perform 3 
Hold 3 
Equalweight 3 
Neutral 3 
In-line 3 
Market Weight 3 
Peer Perform 3 
Maintain Position 3 
Fairly Valued 3 
Equalwt/In-Line 3 
peerperform 3 
equalwt/neutral 3 
in-line/neutral 3 
equalwt/positive 3 
Equalwt/attractive 3 
neutral weight 3 
neutral 2 3 
in-line/attractive 3 
neutral/neutral 3 
average 3 
neutral 1 3 
below average 3 
equalwt/negative 3 
industry perform 3 
in-line/cautious 3 
long-term hold 3 
maintain 3 
market neutral 3 
moderate underperformer 3 
neutral 2 3 
neutral rate 3 
neutral/attractive 3 
neutral/cautious 3 
neutral/neutral 3 
perform in line 3 
performer 3 
sector weight 3 
short-term market perform 3 
 XIX 
Equalwt/Cautious 3 
Short-term Hold 3 
corporate 3 
cautious 4 
underwt/positive 4 
sell/neutral 4 
sell/attractive 4 
Unattractive 4 
underperf/attractive 4 
underperf/neutral 4 
underwt/attractive 4 
underwt/in-line 4 
underwt/neutral 4 
underwt/positive 4 
Underweight 4 
Sell 4 
Negative 4 
Reduce 4 
Sector Underperform 4 
Underperform 4 
underwt/cautious 4 
short sell 4 
sell/cautious 4 
industry underperform 4 
market underperform 4 
reduce 1 4 
reduce 2 4 
short-term underperform 4 
underperf/cautious 4 
underwt/cautious 4 
underwt/negative 4 
avoid 5 
Strong Sell 5 
swap 5 
susp/positive 6 
Not Rated 6 
No Rating System 6 
suspended coverage 6 
restricted 6 
source of funds 6 
susp/negative 6 
susp/neutral 6 
susp/positive 6 
 XX 
Rating Suspended 6 
under review 6 
Table 11: Rating definitions and their attached Rating according to the 5-point Rating Scale 
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Table 12: Event-counts per Company
Company Eventcounts Company eventcount
AAPL UW Equity 91
AAPL UW Equity 91 AXP UN Equity 85
AXP UN Equity 85 BA UN Equity 82
BA UN Equity 82 CAT UN Equity 77
CAT UN Equity 77 CSCO UW Equity 125
CSCO UW Equity 125 CVX UN Equity 63
CVX UN Equity 63 DD UN Equity 58
DD UN Equity 58 DIS UN Equity 82
DIS UN Equity 82 GE UN Equity 51
GE UN Equity 51 GS UN Equity 91
GS UN Equity 91 HD UN Equity 72
HD UN Equity 72 IBM UN Equity 56
IBM UN Equity 56 INTC UW Equity 140
INTC UW Equity 140 JNJ UN Equity 67
JNJ UN Equity 67 JPM UN Equity 89
JPM UN Equity 89 KO UN Equity 56
KO UN Equity 56 MCD UN Equity 66
MCD UN Equity 66 MMM UN Equity 42
MMM UN Equity 42 MRK UN Equity 61
MRK UN Equity 61 MSFT UW Equity 81
MSFT UW Equity 81 NKE UN Equity 58
NKE UN Equity 58 PFE UN Equity 67
PFE UN Equity 67 PG UN Equity 58
PG UN Equity 58 TRV UN Equity 79
TRV UN Equity 79 UNH UN Equity 48
UNH UN Equity 48 UTX UN Equity 45
UTX UN Equity 45 V UN Equity 31
V UN Equity 31 VZ UN Equity 113
VZ UN Equity 113 WMT UN Equity 86
WMT UN Equity 86 XOM UN Equity 72
XOM UN Equity 72
Total 2,192
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Figure 8: Histogram Abnormal Returns with Normal Density Curve 
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Table 13: Average Abnormal Returns of Upgrades over Event Days t= -20 to t= +120 
Upgrades
Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic
-20 -0.0026 -0.06 +22 -0.0488 -1.21
-19 -0.0074 -0.02 +23 -0.0303 -0.08
-18 -0.0531 -1.20 +24 -0.0175 -0.43
-17 0.0685* 1.49 +25 -0.1046** -2.44
-16 -0.0612 -1.34 +26 -0.0495 -1.17
-15 -0.0080 -0.16 +27 -0.0071 -0.18
-14 -0.1158** -2.34 +28 -0.1011** -2.14
-13 -0.1339 -0.30 +29 -0.0142 -0.36
-12 0.1646 0.37 +30 0.0445 1.11
-11 0.0570 1.27 +31 -0.1148*** -2.67
-10 -0.0752* -1.67 +32 -0.0819 -1.59
-9 0.0626* 1.53 +33 0.0524* 1.32
-8 0.0659* 1.44 +34 -0.0163 -0.41
-7 0.0572 1.28 +35 -0.0053 -0.11
-6 0.0026 0.06 +36 -0.0794** -2.06
-5 0.0631* 1.51 +37 -0.0045 -1.12
-4 -0.0395 -0.10 +38 0.1262 0.66
-3 -0.0380 -0.81 +39 -0,1049** -2.50
-2 -0.0092 -0.02 +40 -0.0201 -0.55
-1 0.0626 1.04 +41 -0.0039 -0.23
0 0.0844 1.26 +42 0.0221 0.60
+1 -0.0339 -0.08 +43 -0.0398 -1.09
+2 0.0016 0.04 +44 -0.0339 -0.91
+3 -0.0115 -0.03 +45 0.0022 0.06
+4 0.0247 0.69 +46 -0.0759** -2.03
+5 -0.0786** -2.01 +47 -0.0148 -0.41
+6 -0.0816** -2.37 +48 -0.1513 -1.40
+7 -0.0380 -1.13 +49 0.0008 0.02
+8 0.0037 0.10 +50 -0.0742* -1.91
+9 -0.0886*** -2.73 +51 -0.0308 -0.74
+10 0.0385 1.11 +52 -0.1102*** -2.78
+11 0.0532* 1.44 +53 0.0083 0.23
+12 -0.0014 -0.04 +54 -0.0433 -1.09
+13 -0.0033 -0.08 +55 -0.0373 -0.97
+14 -0.0318 -0.09 +56 -0.0242 -0.65
+15 -0.0737* -1.81 +57 -0.0499 -1.19
+16 0.0180 0.44 +58 0.0056 0.13
+17 -0.0048 -0.12 +59 -0.0646* -1.68
+18 0.0016 0.05 +60 -0.0174 -0.45
+19 -0.0180 -0.53 +61 -0.0937** -2.56
+20 -0.0066 -0.17 +62 -0.0143 -0.33
+21 -0.0054 -0.14 +63 0.0652* 1.43
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Table 13: Average Abnormal Returns of Upgrades over Event Days t= -20 to t= +120 
 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.28, 1.65 and 2.33 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level for one-tailed significance test. 
 
Upgrades - Continued
Event day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic Event day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic
+64 -0.0129 -0.33 +93 0.0419 0.96
+65 -0.0930 -1.59 +94 0.0049 0.12
+66 -0.0469 -1.07 +95 -0.0353 -0.93
+67 -0.1208*** -2.62 +96 0.3450*** 2.63
+68 -0.0143 -0.38 +97 0.0325 0.86
+69 -0.0586 -1.55 +98 -0.0312 -0.73
+70 -0.0414 -1.09 +99 0.0036 0.09
+71 -0.0077 -0.20 +100 -0.0816 -2.09
+72 -0.0576* -1.68 +101 0.0362 0.09
+73 -0.0872** -2.40 +102 0.0010 0.02
+74 0.0012 0.03 +103 -0.0028 -0.70
+75 0.0244 0.63 +104 -0.0379 -0.97
+76 -0.0080 -0.23 +105 -0.0039 -0.24
+77 -0.0143 -0.40 +106 -0.0883** -1.99
+78 -0.0748** -2.06 +107 -0.0463 -1.32
+79 0.0553* 1.44 +108 0.0084 0.18
+80 -0.0340 -0.99 +109 0.0098 0.23
+81 -0.0640* -1.89 +110 0.0487 1.27
+82 -0.0021 -0.05 +111 -0.0255 -0.72
+83 -0.0435 -1.18 +112 -0.0119*** -3.19
+84 -0.0098** -2.50 +113 0.0134 0.32
+85 -0.0476 -1.40 +114 0.0236 0.65
+86 -0.0534 -1.35 +115 -0.0957** -2.55
+87 -0.0720* -1.87 +116 -0.0955*** -2.74
+88 0.0381 0.97 +117 -0.0507 -1.50
+89 -0.0275 -0.72 +118 -0.0488 -1.43
+90 -0.0496 -1.28 +119 0.0145 0.38
+91 -0.0130 -0.33 +120 -0.0249 -0.74
+92 0.0279 0.63
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Table 14: Average Abnormal Returns of Downgrades over Event Days t= -20 to t= +120 
 
Downgrades
Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic
-20 -0.1679 -0.43 +22 0.0110 0.29
-19 -0.0120 -0.33 +23 -0.1024***,*** 2.73
-18 -0.1024**,*** -2.52 +24 -0.0426 -1.13
-17 -0.0471 -1.08 +25 -0.0591* -1.39
-16 0.0206 0.44 +26 0.0272 0.63
-15 0.0148 0.34 +27 -0.0162 -0.42
-14 0.0177 0.48 +28 -0.0091 -0.25
-13 -0.0139 -0.37 +29 -0.0274 -0.76
-12 0.0272 0.66 +30 -0.0576* -1.46
-11 0.0342 0.78 +31 0.0204 0.49
-10 -0.0562* -1.33 +32 -0.0410 -1.04
-9 -0.0202 -0.52 +33 0.0121 0.30
-8 -0.0616* -1.64 +34 0.0113 0.31
-7 0.0521 1.32 +35 0.0626* 1.68
-6 -0.0212 -0.52 +36 0.0185 0.48
-5 -0.0434 -0.18 +37 0.0105 0.30
-4 0.0326 0.78 +38 -0.0048 -0.13
-3 0.0365 0.81 +39 0.0631* 1.72
-2 0.0022 0.05 +40 0.0023 0.06
-1 -0.1299**,** -2.30 +41 -0.0137 -0.40
0 -0.2621***,*** -3.65 +42 -0.0358 -0.85
+1 -0.1217***,*** -2.80 +43 -0.0395 -1.02
+2 0.0247 0.67 +44 -0.0340 -1.06
+3 -0.0426 -1.21 +45 -0.0520* -1.48
+4 0.0361 0.97 +46 -0.0715*,** -1.78
+5 -0.0465* -1.35 +47 -0.0841**,*** -2.38
+6 0.0242 0.74 +48 -0.0530* -1.53
+7 0.0343 1.05 +49 -0.0214 -0.55
+8 0.0123 0.41 +50 0.0038 0.10
+9 0.0464 1.40 +51 -0.0289 -0.78
+10 0.0535 1.51 +52 -0.0235 -0.64
+11 -0.0153 -0.49 +53 -0.0737**,** -2.17
+12 0.0184 0.57 +54 -0.0616* -1.63
+13 -0.0389 -1.14 +55 0.0140 0.36
+14 -0.0488* -1.50 +56 0.0589* 1.74
+15 -0.0398 -1.21 +57 -0.0755*,** -1.88
+16 -0.0581**,* -1.78 +58 -0.0447 -1.03
+17 -0.0295 -0.97 +59 -0.1078***,*** -2.63
+18 0.0373 1.08 +60 0.0107 0.25
+19 0.0311 0.88 +61 -0.0380 -0.09
+20 -0.0197 -0.52 +62 0.0461 1.22
+21 -0.0068 -0.18 +63 0.0204 0.51
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Table 14: Average Abnormal Returns of Downgrades over Event Days t= -20 to t= +120 
 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.28, 1.65 and 2.33 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level for one-tailed significance test. 
 
Downgrades - Continued
Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Stat Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Stat
+64 -0.0237 -0.55 +93 -0.0367 -0.90
+65 -0.0967*,** -1.76 +94 -0.0395 -1.09
+66 0.0364 0.81 +95 -0.0513* 1.36
+67 -0.1098**,*** -2.35 +96 0.1217*** 3.30
+68 -0.0179 -0.46 +97 -0.0741**,** -2.09
+69 -0.0144 -0.37 +98 0.0418 0.99
+70 -0.0627* -1.63 +99 -0.0500* -1.32
+71 0.0181 0.52 +100 0,1012*** 2.76
+72 -0.0600*,** -1.76 +101 -0.0484* -1.36
+73 -0.0065 -0.19 +102 -0.0638* -1.57
+74 0,0606* 1.74 +103 0.0249 0.71
+75 0.0353 1.01 +104 0.0376 1.02
+76 -0.0227 -0.64 +105 -0.0888***,*** -2.56
+77 0.0065 0.17 +106 -0.0036 -0.10
+78 -0.0125 -0.34 +107 -0.0311 -0.89
+79 -0.0079 -0.23 +108 -0.0050 -0.14
+80 0.0301 0.81 +109 0.0245 0.64
+81 -0.0684*,** -1.82 +110 -0.0414 -1.14
+82 -0.0460 -1.27 +111 -0.0710**,** -2.03
+83 0.0200 0.57 +112 0.0159 0.48
+84 -0.0103 -0.27 +113 -0.0197 -0.57
+85 -0.0149 -0.39 +114 -0.0480* -1.30
+86 0.0356 0.98 +115 -0.0809**,** -2.30
+87 -0.0132 -0.34 +116 -0.0533*,** -1.80
+88 -0.0257 -0.67 +117 -0.0405 -1.16
+89 0.0098 0.27 +118 -0.0760**,** -2.06
+90 -0.0747**,** -2.03 +119 -0.0635*,** -1.91
+91 0.0430 1.10 +120 -0.0096 -0.29
+92 -0.0242 -0.65
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Table 15: Cumulative Abnormal Returns over Event Days t= -20 to t= +20 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
Upgrades Downgrades
Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic Event Day (t) Mean (%) t-Statistic
-20 -0.0013 -0.03 -20 -0.0107 -0.27
-19 -0.0044 -0.07 -19 -0.0234 -0.43
-18 -0.0555 -0.72 -18 -0.1223* -1.82
-17 0.0095 0.11 -17 -0.1803** -2.38
-16 -0.0483 -0.48 -16 -0.1559* -1.83
-15 -0.0515 -0.47 -15 -0.1408 -1.50
-14 -0.1706 -1.45 -14 -0.1215 -1.21
-13 -0.1801 -1.44 -13 -0.1360 -1.31
-12 -0.1621 -1.22 -12 -0.1195 -1.08
-11 -0.1093 -0.79 -11 -0.0915 -0.80
-10 -0.1867 -1.32 -10 -0.1460 -1.26
-9 -0.1277 -0.91 -9 -0.1597 -1.32
-8 -0.0587 -0.40 -8 -0.2212* -1.74
-7 0.0000 0.00 -7 -0.1784 -1.37
-6 0.0001 0.00 -6 -0.1932 -1.42
-5 0.0537 0.33 -5 -0.2358* -1.70
-4 0.0108 0.06 -4 -0.2109 -1.47
-3 -0.0314 -0.18 -3 -0.1752 -1.17
-2 -0.0370 -0.21 -2 -0.1737 -1.14
-1 0.0134 0.07 -1 -0.3028* -1.86
0 0.0964 0.50 0 -0.5690*** -3.16
+1 0.0673 0.34 +1 -0.6966*** -3.77
+2 0.0761 0.38 +2 -0.6779*** -3.62
+3 0.0652 0.32 +3 -0.7137*** -3.70
+4 0.0862 0.41 +4 -0.6904*** -3.57
+5 0.0106 0.05 +5 -0.7421*** -3.76
+6 -0.0719 -0.33 +6 -0.7184*** -3.61
+7 -0.1076 -0.49 +7 -0.6818*** -3.40
+8 -0.1025 -0.46 +8 -0.66814*** -3.33
+9 -0.1946 -0.86 +9 -0.6163*** -3.04
+10 -0.1590 -0.69 +10 -0.5649*** -2.72
+11 -0.1105 -0.47 +11 -0.5800*** -2.78
+12 -0.1115 -0.47 +12 -0.5606 -2.68
+13 -0.1148 -0.48 +13 -0.5963*** 2.81
+14 -0.1473 -0.62 +14 -0.6471*** -3.02
+15 -0.2207 -0.09 +15 -0.6850*** -3.17
+16 -0.2069 -0.85 +16 -0.7421*** -3.41
+17 -0.2027 -0.82 +17 -0.7717*** -3.53
+18 -0.1983 -0.79 +18 -0.7308*** -3.33
+19 -0.2082 -0.83 +19 -0.6967*** -3.13
+20 -0.2130 -0.84 +20 -0.7170** -3.20
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Figure 9: Scatterplot of Residuals against Fitted Values Model 1 to 5 of Buy sample 
 
 
Figure 10: Scatterplot of Residuals squared against Fitted Values Model 1 to 5 of Buy sample 
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Figure 11: Scatterplot of Residuals against Fitted Values Model 1 to 5 of Sell sample 
 
 
Figure 12: Scatterplot of Residuals squared against Fitted Values Model 1 to 5 of Sell sample 
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Figure 13: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test output model which uses CAR ( -5, +120) 
 
 
 
Table 16: Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables, Buy and Sell combined 
 
 
 
Table 17: Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables of Upgrades 
 
 
 
Table 18: Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables of Downgrades 
 
 
 
 
 
ALL
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG -0.0074 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0208 0.3122 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0276 -0.0784 -0.0526 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL -0.0112 0.0317 -0.0041 -0.4252 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7965 -0.0151 0.0001 0.0495 -0.0187 1.0000
Buy
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG -0.0345 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0040 0.2816 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0401 -0.2959 -0.0647 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL -0.0526 0.1114 0.0079 -0.4412 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7986 0.0019 -0.0189 0.0695 -0.0761 1.0000
Sell
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG 0.0115 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0339 0.3289 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0162 0.01717 -0.0444 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL 0.0246 -0.0267 -0.0149 -0.04128 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7948 -0.0251 0.0156 0.0322 1.0000
Buy
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG 0.0115 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0339 0.3289 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0162 0.0717 -0.0444 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL 0.0246 -0.0267 -0.0149 -0.4128 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7984 -0.0251 0.0156 0.0322 0.0308 1.0000
Sell
COVER ANALYST STRONG SKIPRANK MARKET TYPE TRADING SIGNAL COVER BROKER
COVER ANALYST 1.0000
STRONG 0.0115 1.0000
SKIPRANK 0.0339 0.3289 1.0000
MARKET TYPE 0.0162 0.01717 -0.0444 1.0000
TRADING SIGNAL 0.0246 -0.0267 -0.0149 -0.04128 1.0000
COVER BROKER 0.7948 -0.0251 0.0156 0.0322 1.0000
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Figure 14: Graphical inspection of Outliers of Upgrades 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Graphical inspection of Outliers of Downgrades 
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Table 19: Determinants of Stock Price Performance of Upgrades 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return from event day 𝑡1 to event day 𝑡2. 
Definitions of variables: 
COVERANALAYST, equals the mean number of analysts’ coverage for a stock. 
STRONG, for upgrades, equals one if the recommendation is a strong buy and zero otherwise (buy). For downgrades, 
equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold).  
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero otherwise (do not change a 
rank).  
MARKETTYPE equals one if the recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short and long-term moving average 
cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the cross of both moving averages signalled sell. Buy signal is 
often viewed as an indicator of an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as an indicator of an emerging 
downward moving market. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-5, +120) CAR (-10, -1) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (0, +10)
COVER ANALYST -0.00287 -0.0266* -0.000460 0.000201 -0.0131**
(0.00596) (0.0159) (0.00685) (0.00431) (0.00545)
STRONG -0.897 -3.343** -0.521 -0.376 -1.305***
(0.569) -1.622 (0.551) (0.408) (0.480)
SKIPRANK 0.523 2.620 -0.466 0.479 0.775
(0.579) -1.611 (0.511) (0.368) (0.587)
MarketType -1.127** -6.201*** -0.00995 -0.578 -1.230**
(0.574) -1.607 (0.670) (0.442) (0.499)
TradingSignal 0.926*** 0.416 0.552* 0.384 0.445
(0.329) (0.931) (0.323) (0.251) (0.285)
Constant 0.821 4.173* -0.0380 0.391 1.800***
(0.773) -2.175 (0.964) (0.571) (0.681)
Observations 1,002 950 1,002 1,002 1,002
Prob > F 0.0002 0.0011 0.3988 0.0906 0.0006
R-squared 0.025 0.034 0.004 0.011 0.029
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 XXXIII 
 
Table 20: Determinants of Stock Price Performance of Upgrades 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level 
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return from event day 𝑡1 to event day 𝑡2. 
Definitions of variables: 
STRONG, for upgrades, equals one if the recommendation is a strong buy and zero otherwise (buy). For downgrades, 
equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold).  
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero otherwise (do not change a 
rank).  
MARKETTYPE equals one if the recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short and long-term moving average 
cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the cross of both moving averages signalled sell. Buy signal is 
often viewed as an indicator of an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as an indicator of an emerging 
downward moving market. 
COVERBROKER, equals the mean number of brokerage coverage for a stock. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-5, +120) CAR (-10, -1) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (0, +10)
STRONG -0.868 -3.20** -0.497 -0.369 -1.24***
(0.570) (1.613) (0.551) (0.408) (0.478)
SKIPRANK 0.500 2.52 -0.487 0.473 0.726
(0.575) (1.599) (0.507) (0.367) (0.586)
MarketType -1.10* -6.10*** 0.0223 -0.567 -1.19**
(0.00574) (1.605) (0.667) (0.444) (0.498)
TradingSignal 0.908*** 0.364 0.527 0.375 0.432
(0.327) (0.918) (0.324) (0.249) (0.285)
COVER BROKER -0.0092 -0.0356* -0.0096 -0.0031 -0.0155***
(0.00676) (0.0202) (0.00740) (0.0047) (0.0059)
Constant 1.26* 4.66** 0.627 0.634 1.88***
(0.00743) (2.205) (0.977) (0.534) (0.668)
Observations 1,002 950 1,002 1,002 1,002
Prob > F 0.0007 0.0002 0.1872 0.0829 0.0006
R-squared 0.027 0.035 0.006 0.012 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 XXXIV 
 
Table 21: Determinants of Stock Price Performance of Downgrades 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level.  
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return from event day 𝑡1 to event day 𝑡2. 
Definitions of variables: 
COVERANALAYST, equals the mean number of analysts’ coverage for a stock. 
STRONG, for upgrades, equals one if the recommendation is a strong buy and zero otherwise (buy). For downgrades, 
equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold).  
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero otherwise (do not change a 
rank).  
MARKETTYPE equals one if the recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short and long-term moving average 
cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the cross of both moving averages signalled sell. Buy signal is 
often viewed as an indicator of an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as an indicator of an emerging 
downward moving market. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-5, +120) CAR (-10, -1) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (0, +10)
COVER ANALYST -0.00620 -0.0107 -0.000138 0.000227 -0,00347
(0.00670) (0.0154) (0.00320) (0.00449) (0.00580)
STRONG -0.123 1.585 -0.173 -0.0148 0,0352
(0.448) -1.086 (0.219) (0.304) (0.366)
SKIPRANK -0.437 -0.0352 -0.360 0.104 0,053
(0.570) -1.414 (0.276) (0.373) (0.499)
MarketType -0.0985 -3.009** 0.443* 0.464 -0.250
(0.592) -1.482 (0.244) (0.397) (0.511)
TradingSignal -0.375 0.614 -0.283 -0.112 0.598**
(0.332) (0.750) (0.174) (0.236) (0.261)
Constant -0.865 0.529 -0.564 -0.846 -0,0404
(0.780) -1.906 (0.362) (0.529) (0.666)
Observations 1,188 1,127 1,188 1,188 1,188
Prob > F 0.7099 0.1218 0.0417 0.8006 0.2491
R-squared 0.002 0.012 0.010 0.003 0.006
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 XXXV 
 
Table 22: Determinants of Stock Price Performance of Downgrades 
T-statistics with an absolute value of 1.65, 1.96 and 2.58 indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively * indicates statistical significance at less than the 0.10 level, ** at less than the 0.05 level and *** indicates 
statistical significance at less than the 0.01 level 
 
CAR = Cumulative abnormal return from event day 𝑡1 to event day 𝑡2. 
Definitions of variables: 
STRONG, for upgrades, equals one if the recommendation is a strong buy and zero otherwise (buy). For downgrades, 
equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold).  
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero otherwise (do not change a 
rank).  
MARKETTYPE equals one if the recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short and long-term moving average 
cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the cross of both moving averages signalled sell. Buy signal is 
often viewed as an indicator of an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as an indicator of an emerging 
downward moving market.  
COVERBROKER, equals the mean number of brokerage coverage for a stock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-5, +120) CAR (-10, -1) CAR (-1, +1) CAR (0, +10)
STRONG -0.129 -1.561 -0.383 -0.0264 0.00711
(0.449) -1.088 (0.375) (0.306) (0.366)
SKIPRANK -0.461 -0,0412 -0,0126 0.117 0.0724
(0.572) -1.414 (0.530) (0.374) (0.498)
MarketType -0.0760 -2.992** -0.148 0.483 -0.212
(0.593) -1.474 (0.525) (0.397) (0.510)
TradingSignal -0.358 0.624 -0.183 -0.0990 0.622**
(0.328) (0.752) (0.269) (0.237) (0.261)
COVER BROKER -0.00200 -0,0107 0,00514 -0.00487 -0.0120*
(0.00794) (0.0174) (0.00625) (0.00514) (0.00622)
Constant -0.248 0.450 -0.401 -0.487 0.531
(0.823) -2.027 (0.678) (0.539) (0.672)
Observations 1,188 1,127 1,188 1,188 1,188
Prob > F 0.8586 0.1298 0.7768 0.6483 0.0869
R-squared 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.010
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 XXXVI 
 
Table 23: Distribution of Explanatory Dummy Variables 
Definitions of variables: 
STRONG, for upgrades, equals one if the recommendation is a strong buy and zero otherwise (buy). For downgrades, 
equals one if the recommendation is a strong sell or sell and zero otherwise (hold).  
SKIPRANK takes the value one if the change in recommendation skipped a rank and zero otherwise (do not change a 
rank).  
MARKETTYPE equals one if the recommendation was revised in the bull market phase and zero otherwise (bear market).  
TRADINGSIGNAL equals one if the change in recommendation happened when the short and long-term moving average 
cross showed a buy signal and zero otherwise, when the cross of both moving averages signalled sell. Buy signal is 
often viewed as an indicator of an emerging upward moving market and sell signal as an indicator of an emerging 
downward moving market.  
 
 
 
 
 
       Upgrades           Downgrades
0 1 0 1
STRONG 89.03% 10.97% 82.24% 17.76%
SKIPRANK 91.82% 8.18% 89.73% 10.27%
MARKET TYPE 16.35% 83.65% 14.98% 85.02%
TRADING SIGNAL 56.23% 43.77% 53.54% 46.46%
COVER_BROKER 70.89% 29.11% 72.11% 27.89%
YEAR2001 95.11% 4.89% 96.72% 3.28%
YEAR2002 95.91% 4.09% 91.25% 8.75%
YEAR2003 94.62% 5.38% 95.20% 4.80%
YEAR2004 93.62% 6.38% 95.71% 4.29%
YEAR2005 91.58% 8.42% 95.88% 4.12%
YEAR2006 95.11% 4.89% 95.12% 4.88%
YEAR2007 95.12% 4.88% 95.96% 4.04%
YEAR2008 94.22% 5.78% 93.86% 6.14%
YEAR2009 90.93% 9.07% 93.43% 6.57%
YEAR2010 91.82% 8.18% 95.20% 4.80%
YEAR2011 92.32% 7.68% 93.69% 6.31%
YEAR2012 96.01% 3.99% 90.97% 9.03%
YEAR2013 94.82% 5.18% 90.91% 9.09%
YEAR2014 95.01% 4.99% 94.02% 5.98%
YEAR2015 92.72% 7.28% 92.93% 7.07%
YEAR2016 94.72% 5.28% 94.28% 5.72%
YEAR2017 94.62% 5.38% 0.00% 100.00%
